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Appeal from USDC 
N.D. California 
(Hamlin, C .J.; 
East & Sweigert) 
Timely 
STARK Timely 
Appeal from USDC 
v. N.D. California 
(Hamlin, C.J.; 
SHULTZ East & Sweigert) 
1. Appellants, plaintiffs below and appellees in -








transactions reporting requirements of the Bank Secrecy 
Act of 1970. The District Court's ruling was unanimous 
on these issueso 
2. Appellants are described in the memo in 
Noo 72-1073. As noted in that memo, the Bank Secrecy Act 
is generally aimed at requiring the maintenance of records 
which "have a high degree of usefulness in criminal, tax, -or regulatory investigation or proceedings." -Title I of ½ 
the Act -- a'S written and implemented -- "broadly requires," 
~ 
according to the District Court, "financial institutions to 
maintain, not only customary ledger card records for com-
mercial and savings accounts, but also to maintain microfilm 
of all checks, drafts or similar instruments drawn on or 
presented for payment or received for deposit or collection." 
(With the exception of certain types of accounts not relevant 
here.) It is important to note that Title I contains no 
reporting requirements. These additional records must be 
kept by banks, but there is no provision for the obtaining of 
these records, other. than by presently available means. 
I '--_________ ' .......__, 
I 
The foreign transactions reporting provision of Title II 
of the Act provides gener~lly that ~rso~s must report trans-
portations of monetary instruments into or out of the United 
States, or receipt of such instruments in the country from 
outside, if the transaction involves more than $5,000. The 






3. REASONING OF THE DISTRICT COURT: 
a. As to the general recordkeeping require-
ments of Title I, the District Court simply stated that 
"since we find no constitutional violation in these record-
keeping provisions, as such, we reject plaintiffs' conten-
tions. • • • " 
b. With respect to the foreign transactions re-
porting requirements, the court noted: (1) the statute is 
"limited to a narrowly described area of international fi-
nancial transactions"; (2) this Court has permitted greater 
surveillance by the executive where foreign relations are 
involved than is permitted in domestic matters; (3) the Act 
contains procedural protections, including a provision au-
thorizing the Secretary to get a search warrant if he "has 
reason to believe that monetary instruments" are being 
transported in violation of the foreign transactions require-
ments. 
4. CONTENTIONS: 
a. Title I. California Bankers Association [CBA], 
_, ---------------
appellant in No. 72-985, attacks only the recordkeeping re-
quirements of Title I. It maintains that the Act makes banks 
"unwilling and unwitting diarists of their customers' financial 
lives," and that requiring banks to keep records so that the 
Government can check up on the depositors -- not the banks --





company to retain recordings of all of its customers' 
calls. Further, CBA argues that the Act has an unreason-
able scope and requires unnecessary amounts of records to 
be kept. The ACLU, in No. 72-1196, makes similar arguments: 
.,---...__ -(1) the recordkeeping requirements are different from others 
first because of the "staggering" scope and size of the 
material "seized" and second because the "coercion of record-
keeping [is] not directed to the regulation of the record-
keeper but to the surveillance of someone else"; (2) the 
effect of these requirements is to "create" evidence or to 
"preserve it beyond its normal life" and such use of massive 
recordkeeping for law enforcement pur poses is violative of 
the First and Fourteenth Amendments, just as a requirement 
that the phone company keep records of all calls would be. 
The ACLU further argues that this Court should extend the 
right to privacy to individual's financial affairs and the 
records thereof • 
The SG counters these various arguments, roughly 
as follows: (1) the Act contains no disclosure provisions , 
and therefore all these attacks on the recordkeeping require-
ments are premature; it would only be relevant when the --------governmenti:ries to obtain copies of this newly created gold-
mine of information. (2) The Act's disclosure requirements 
are not "staggering"; Congress found as a legislative fact 








(3) This case is basically like Shapiro v. United States, 
335 U.S. 1 (1948), in that it involves records required 
to be kept by the Government, although here -- unlike most 
recordkeeping cases -- there is generally no question about 
self-incrimination of the recordkeeper. The SG further argues 
that this is not a privacy case and Griswold, et al., are ....___ ________ _
"wholly inapposite here." (Appx. A of the SG's Brief lists 
numerous recordkeeping statutes.) 
b. Title II. Appellant in No. 72-985 does not 
~
attack this title, as far as I can tell. The ACLU does, 
however~ Basical~y, it argues that the reporting requirement 
seizes an unreasonable amount of information in light of the 
purpose to be achieved: "The government has never argued 
that simply because a large cash transaction is outside the 
'customary conduct' [one of the Secretary's exceptions] of one 
of the parties that it is likely to be illegal. • • • " The 
ACLU further argues that it makes no difference that the 
seizure involves information about transactions that happened 
to cross borders and, therefore, United States v. United States 
District Court may not be invoked to support a broader latitude 
for this surveillance than the one struck down for domestic 
transactions. Finally, re.lying on Marchetti and Gross ~ , 390 
U.S. 39, 62 (1968), the ACLU claims that the reporting require-






The SG stresses that the Government has plenary 
power to regulate foreign commerce and that that power 
surely includes the power to "prevent the channels of 
foreign commerce from being employed for the purpose of vio-
lating United States criminal, tax and regulatory laws or 
for the purpose of concealing the fruits of ••• criminal 
activity." Further, the SG notes that not all international 
transactions are involved, but only "certain transactions 
involving the physical transportation of monetary amounts in 
excess of $5,000," and the information required is limited 
to the name of the taxpayer and the nature and sip of his 
accounts o The SG further argues that the self-incrimination 
claim is premature, since appellants have not yet been asked 
to give any information at all. 
So DISCUSSION: I apoligize for the shoddiness of the 
treatment of these cases. They a=a obviously involvei-~ 
some complex regulatory schemes that are barely sketched out ........... ____________ _ 
hereo If any of the flavor of the issues has managed to get 
through, I would suggest one of two courses: First, since I 
assume the Court will want to note the Government's appeal 
in No. 72-1073, these two appeals could be taken as well. ---Alternatively, No. 72-985 could be summarily affirmed, since 
it deals only with the general recordkeeping requirements and 
(in my view) is virtually frivolous. Similarly, notation of 






of Title II. In this way, all of Title II would be before 
the Court, without having to also deal with Title I. 
5/23/73 
ME 
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~ Secrecy Act of 1970~ The District Court upheld the consti-







financial record-keeping requirements for banks, and part 
of Title II, which deals with mandatory reporting of certain 
foreign transactions. These issues will be discussed in 
the other memos. At issue here is the constitutionality of 
that part of Title II of the Bank Secrecy Act dealing with 
mandatory reporting of certain domestic currency transactions . 
The District Court struck down this portion of the Act as an 
\f unreasonable search and seizure and as violative of plaintiffs' 
Q rights to privacy. 
2. FACTS: Plaintiffs (appellees herein) include 
several individual bank customers (and the ACLU, as a bank 
customer), a bank, and a California Banking Association . J hey 
challenged§§ 221 and 222 of the Banking Secrecy Act, which 
provide broadly that: 
Transactions involving any domestic fi-
nancial institution shall be reported to 
the Secretary at such time and such man-
ner, and in such detail as the Secretary 
may require if they involve the payment, 
receipt, or' trans f er of United States 
currency, or such other monetrary instru-
ments as the Secretary may specify, in 
such amounts, denominations, or both-,-or 
under such circumstances, as the Secretary 
shall by regulation prescribe. 
The report of any transaction required 
to be reported. • • • shall be signed or 
otherwise made both by the domestic finan-
cial institution .involved and by one or 
more of the other parties thereto or parti-
cipants therein, as the Secretary may re-
quire. 
Under these sections of the Act, the Secretary promulgated 







institutions (not the private party) to file reports of 
transactions involving § ly currencp (no personal checks), 
and only if such transactions are in excess of $10,000. 
3. REASONING OF THE DISTRICT COURT: The key fact 
about the District Court's holding (with Judge Hamlin dis-
senting) is that it focuses on the statute as written, rather 
than on the regulations promulgated thereunder. So viewed, 
the majority posed the following question: 
The question is wheth.er these pro-
visions, oroacD.y authori zing an execu-
tive a9ency of goveTI1g1ent to res ujJ;e 
financial institut~ons and parties to 
or parf icipants in transactions with ,A,.uv 
them, to routinely report to it, with- r~-
out previous j uchciar o"f' a dmi "nis trative / q IV '1 
summons, subpoena or warrant, the detail / 1 ~ ' 
of almost every conceivable financ i a l --r'v -~ 
tra nsaction as= a surveiliance aevice for ~ , _·J), 
t he discov~ of possible wrongdoing on ~r,,v 
the part of bank customers, is such an 'J/1'/ 
invasion of a citizen's right of privacy p-~ 
as amounts to an unreasonable search f-o 
within the meaning of the Fourth Amend-
ment. 
The Court held that it was. It was cp palled by the sweeping 
character of the regulation enacted and concluded that the 
sweep was unnecessary, and infringed on the reasonable expecta-
tion that a person's checks (in particular) will be returned to 
---==== 
.., 
him and not channeled routinely through a government bureaucracy . 
The District Court stressed that the statute authorized the 
Secretary to require reports from all parties to the transaction, 
that transactions including personal checks could be included, 










to be covered. 
4 . CONTENTIONS: There is no response to this appeal. 
The SG is mildly upset at the District Court's decision and 
~
suggests that the District Court read the statute broadly, in 
order to strike it down on its face o (JS, at 12) The SG does 
not discuss whether the statute, as written, is constitutional. 
Rather, he insists that hornbook law requires that the statute, 
particularly a statute that contemplates implementing regula-
tions, be analyzed "as applied," not on its face. As implemente d ---, 
the SG stresses that the Act applies only to transactions of 
more than $10,000 and that, as to them, it only requires report-
. f ll . \l h ing o currency transactions, not tote more numerous and com-
monplace check transactions . [Note: He further offers convinc-
ing legislative history that checks were not intended to be 
included in the reporting requirements and that the term "other 
monetary instruments" is meant only to make sure that the 
Secretary can reach all kinds of negotiable, bearer paper.] -~- ~ 
'( Finally, the SG points out that the regulations~ y apply to 
V financial institutions, not to individuals. 
Thus construed, the SG maintains that the Act is reason-_____. 
able and necessary as a means of obtaining information of types 
of records which "have a high degree of usefulness in criminal, 
• f 
tax, or regulatory investigations or proceedings . " §§ 101 and 
121 of the Act. 
5. DISCUSSION: The SG's brief is considerably more 






appropri ate to consider the Act as implemented in light of 
the obv ious intent of Congress to leave much of the implementa-
tion to the Secretary of the Treasury. There are no responses. 
Ideally, they should be called for. But because it's June, 
and the parties have filed appeals of their own, it may be 
permissible to just note this appeal now, without waiting until 
the fall for responseso (The record does not indicate that a 
stay has been granted. Perhaps it should also be noted that, 
although the District Court granted only a preliminary injunc-
tion, both the court and the parties have treated it as being 
permanent . ) 
There is no response. 
5/22/73 Hoffman 
ME 
DC in Juris o State-
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No. 72-1073 
Shultz v. California Bankers 
Appeal from USDCND Calif 
The conference requested responses from the ACLU and 
. -- .___ .___. 
from the Calif Bankers' Ass'n in this appeal by the SG, 
challenging the UD's holding that a portion of Title II of 
the Bank Secrecy Acy was unconstitutional. The responses 
add nothing except the thought, which I find persuasive, 
that all three of the provisions involved in this case 
and the two companions (No. 72-985 and 72-1196) are inter-
twined. No. 72-985 involves the r~cordkeeping portion of 
<::::;;;a 
the statutes it requires no d~sclosure but mandates a manmoutf 
amount ~f recordat~n. The DC found it harmless--but it did 
so in the context of striking down the sections dealing with 
disclosure. If this Ct is prepared to reverse the DC on the 
l disclosure material, then it probably should reconsider the extent of the recordkeeping required. 






Likewise, the international-transaction disclosure 
section should probably be considered in conjunction with 
the internal disclosur requirements. If the former is valid 
while the latter fails it is because there is a difference 
in the extent of governmental power with respect to matters 
involving foreign activities or commerce. This is the 
11gut issu: underlying much of the discussion about the US v. - ~ -~---------USDC case--the debaJe over the difference between foreign aNd -
domestic subversion 
Because of the ~:a,g~ua-.1,,8~ of the 
statute, I suggest that you vote to note all three cases 
and have them heard together. It is after all a single 
legislative package that would be considered. 
NOTE LAH 
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MEMORANDUM TO THE CONFERENCE: 
I'll be writing a dissent in 72-985 et al. California Bankers 





- CHAMBERS 01' 
---
,u;n-mu (!Jou:ri of tlrt ~~ .:§udts 
'Jll'u4inghtn. J. <!f. 20.;r~, 
THE CHIEF J .USTICE 
March 7, 1974 
Re: 72-985 - Calif. Bankers Assoc. v. Shultz 
72-1073 - Shultz v. Calif. Bankers Assoc. 
72-1196 - Stark v. Shultz 
Dear Bill: 
Mr. Justice Rehnquist 
Copies to the Conference 
~~ ~ c9 /// 





CHAMBERS 0 .. 
$>ttµr.tll1 I' _cq on.rt itf Utt 'Jll1t1Jt~ ..§tafro 
'rtlard1inntc1t. p. (;. :!:rt,GJi2 
JUSTICE BYRON R. WHITE 
March 18, 1974 
Re: Nos. 72-985, 72-1073 & 72-1196 - California 
Bankers Association v. Shultz 
Dear Bill: 
Please join me. 
Sincerely, 
~vv 
Mr. Jus tice Rehnquist 




.h.;trttttt C!fonrl of tq.t ~ttilt~ j;hdts-
~Mlpnghm. ~. C!f. 20.;i~, 
JUSTICE HARRY A . BLACKMUN 
March 22, 1974 
Re: No. 72-985 - California Bankers Assn. v. Shultz 
No. 72-1073 - Shultz v. California Bankers Assn. 
No. 72-1196 - Stark v. Shultz 
Dear Bill: 
Please join me. 
Sincerely, 
b-
Mr. Justice Rehnquist 
cc: The Conference 
MEMORANDUM 
TO: Mr. John Buckley DATE: March 25, 1975 
FROM: Lewis F. Powell, Jr. 
72-985, 72-1073, 72-1196 - The California 
Bankers Cases 
Everyone has now joined an opinion except Justice Marshall 
aad me. Even the Chief Justice has joined up. 
It is predictable that Justice Marshall will join one or 
both of the dissenting opinions prior to Friday. 
As Friday will be the last Conference before April 12, 
we should decide to bring these cases down at our Conference 
next Friday. ~ 
Sally will deliver the file to you, which contains 
Rehnquist's opinion with my notes on the cover. You will 
observe that I am inclined to join all of the opinion with 
the possible exception of the reporting requirement as to 
domesttic transactions. Justice Rehnquist reasons that since 
the regulations adopted apply on to currency of $10,000 or 
more, we need not be concerned with the broad authorization 
of§ 221 of the Act. Do our cases support his position in 
this respect? In Mourning v. Family Publications Service, Inc., 
(decided last term), the Court went a long ways in saying that 
all an act need do is broadly authorize regulations and the 
agency may adopt pretty much what it pleases. I wanted to 
dissent on that ground, but found no support from any other 
Justice. I finally dissented alone on a narrower ground. 
2. 
.. I have not had time to study carefully the Brennan and 
Douglas dissents filed in the present cases. My impression, 
however, is that both of them go well beyond my concern which 
is directed only to the broad authority vested in the Secretary 
with respect to domestic transactions. If there are Supreme 
Court cases to support me, I would be inclined (i) to join all 
of Rehnquist's opinion except with respect to that aspect of 
it, and (ii) to file only a sentence or two in dissent, stating 
that the staddardless grant of authority to report each and 
every transaction - however small and whether relating to 
currency or not is an invalid delegation of legislative power. 
I do not know whether there is authority for the view that 
if the power were fully exercised, other constitutional rights 
(e.g. Fourth and Fifth Amendment) would be implicated. 
In any event, I would like your advice promptly. If there 
is authority to support my views, please rough me out the 
briefest possible dissent on this one aspect of the law. 
As to standing, I think the ACLU's claim to standing is 
transparently pretextual and I would deny it. If my currency 
would 
transactions were reported to the government, how/it know 
whether or not I belonged to the ACLU? I do not recall whether 
Rehnquist re&id on the ACLU standing issue. 
I do agree with Rehnquist that the California Bankers 
Association had no standing to assert vicariously Fourth 
Amendment claims on behalf of customers. See 44, 45 of his 
opinion. 
L. F. P. , J-;-. 
ss 
3. 
.......... lfp/ss 3/25/74 
MEMORANDUM 
TO: Mr. John Buckley DATE: March 25, 1974 
FROM: Lewis F. Powell, Jr. 
72-985, 72-1073, 72-1196 - The California 
Bankers Cases 
Everyone has now joined an opinion except Justice Marshall 
and me. Even the Chief Justice has joined up. 
It is predictable that Justice Marshall will join one or 
both of the dissenting opinions prior to Friday. 
As Friday will be the last Conference before April 12, 
we should decide to bring these cases down at our Conference 
next Friday. 
Sally will deliver the file to you, which contains 
Rehnquist's opinion with my notes on the cover. You will 
observe that I am inclined to join all of the opinion with 
the possible exception of the reporting requirement as to 
domesti c , transactions. Justice Rehnquist reasons that since 
the regulations adopted apply on to currency of $10,000 or 
more, we need not be concerned with the broad authorization 
of§ 221 of the Act. Do our cases support his position in 
this respect? In Mourning v. Family Publications Service, Inc., 
(decided last term), the Court went a long ways in saying that 
all an act need do is broadly authorize regulations and the 
agency may adopt pretty much what it pleases. I wanted to 
.-
dissent on that ground, but found no support from any other 
Justice. I finally dissented alone on a narrower ground. 
2. 
I have not had time to study carefully the Brennan and 
Douglas dissents filed in the present cases. My impression, 
however, is that both of them go well beyond my concern which 
is directed only to the broad authority vested in the Secretary 
with respect to S!.Q!!!_estic transactions. If there are Supreme ------
Court cases to support me, I would be inclined (i) to join all 
of Rehnquist's opinion except with respect to that aspect of 
it, and (ii) to file only a sentence or two in dissent, stating 
that the standardless grant of authority to report each and 
every transaction - however small and whether relating to 
currency or not is an---!:__nvalid delegation of legislative power. ✓ 
I do not know whether there is authority for the view that 
if the power were fully exercised, other constitutional rights 
(e.g. Fourth and Fifth Amendment) would be implicated. 
In any event, I would like your advice promptly. If there 
is authority to support my views, please rough me out the 
briefest possible dissent on this one aspect of the law. 
As to standing, I think the ACLU's claim to standing is 
transparently pretextual and I would deny it. If my currency 
would 
transactions were reported to the government, how/it know 
whether or not I belonged to the ACLU? I do not recall whether 
Rehnquist rul e d on the ACLU standing issue. 
j · -
I do agree with Rehnquist that the California Bankers 
Association has no standing to assert vicariously Fourth 
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entailing criminal or civil liability. Under the Act, the 
Secretary of the Treasury is authorized to prescribe by 
regulation certain recordkeeping and reporting require-
ments for banks and other :financial institutions in this 
country. Because it has a bearing on our treatment of 
some of the issues raised by the parties, we think it 
important to note that the Act's civil and criminal penal-
ties attach only upon violation of regulations promul-
gated by the Secretary; if the Secretary were to do 
nothing, the Act itself would impose no penalties on 
anyone. 
The express purpose of the Act is to require the main-
tenance of records, and the making of certain reports, 
which "have a high degree of usefulness in criminal, tax, 
or regulatory investigations or proceedings." 12 U. S. C. 
§§ 1829b (a) (2) , 1951; 31 U. S. C. § 1051. Congress 
was apparently concerned with two major problems in 
connection with the enforcement of the regulatory, tax, 
and criminal laws of the United States.1 
First, there was a need to insure that domestic banks 
and financial institutions continued to maintain adequate · 
records of their financial transactions with their cus-
tomers. Congress found that the recent growth of finan-
cial institutions in the United States had been paralleled · 
by an increase in criminal activity which made use of 
these institutions. While many of the records which the 
Secretary by regulation ultimately required to be -kept 
had been traditionally maintained · by the voluntary 
action of many domestic financial institutions, Congress 
1 See generally S. Rep. No. 91-1139, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. (1970); 
H. R. Rep. No. 91-975, 9bt Cong., 2d Sess. (1970); Hearings before 
the House Committee on Banking and Currency on Foreign Bank 
Secrecy and Bank Records, 91st Cong., 1st and 2d Ses8. (1970) ; 
Hearings before the Subcommittee on Financial Institutions of the 
Senate Committee on Banking . and Currency on Foreign Bank 
Secrecy (S. 3678) , 91st Cong., 2d Sess. (1970) . 
> 
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hated that in recent years some larger banks had 
abolished or limited the practice of photocopying checks, 
drafts, and similar instruments drawn on them and pre~ 
sented for payment. The absence of such records, 
whether through failure to make them in the first 
instance or through failure to retain them, was thought 
to seriously impair the ability of the Federal Govern-
ment to enforce the myriad criminal, tax, and regulatory 
provisions of laws which Congress had enacted. At the 
same time, it was recognized by Congress that such 
required records would "not be automatically available 
for law enforcement purposes [but could] only be 
obtained through existing legal process." S. Rep. No. 
91-1139, 91st Cong., 2d Sess., 10 (1970); see H. R. Rep. 
No. 91-975, 91st Cong., 2d Sess., 5 (1970) . 
In addition, Congress felt that there were situations 
where the deposit and. withdrawal of large amounts of 
eurrency or of monetary instruments which were the 
equivalent of currency should be actually reported to the 
Government. While· reports of this nature had been 
required by previous regulations issued by the Treasury 
.Department, it was felt that more precise and detailed 
reporting requirements were needed. The Secretary was 
therefore authorized to require the· reporting of what may 
be described as . large domestic financial transactions in 
currency or its equivalent,. 
Second, Congress was concerned about a serious and 
widespread use of foreign financial institutions, located 
in jurisdictions with strict laws of secrecy as to bank 
activity, for the purpose of violating or evading domestic 
criminal, tax, and regulatory enactments., The House 
Report on the bill, No. 91-975, supra, at 12, described 
the situation in these words . 
"Considerable testim011y was received by the Com-
mittee from the Justice Department, the United-
, > 
72'--985, 72-1073, & 72-1196-0P!NION 
4 CALIFORNIA BANKERS ASSN. v. SHULTZ 
States Attorney for the Southern District of New 
York, the Treasury Department, the Internal Reve-
nue Service, the Securities and Exchange Commis-
sion, the Defense Department and the Agency for 
International Development about serious and wide-
spread use of foreign financial facilities located in 
secrecy jurisdictions for the purpose of violating 
American law. Secret foreign bank accounts and 
secret foreign financial institutions have permitted 
proliferation of 'white collar' crime; have served as 
the financial underpinning of organized criminal 
operations in the United States; hl:!,ve been utilized 
by Americans to evade income taxes, conceal assets 
illegally and purchase gold; have allowed Americans 
and others to avoid the law and regulations govern-
ing securities and exchanges; have served as essen-
tial ingredients in frauds including schemes to 
defraud the United States; have served as the 
ultimate depository of black market proceeds from 
Vietnam; have served as a source of questionable 
financing for conglomerate and other corporate stock 
acquisitions, mergers and takeovers ; have covered 
conspiracies to steal from the U. S. defense and for .. 
eign aid funds ; and have served as a cleansing agent 
for 'hot' or illegally obtained monies. 
"The debilitating effects of the use of these secret 
institutions on Americans and the American econ-
omy are vast. It has been estimated that hundreds 
of millions in tax revenues have been lost. Unwar-
ranted and unwanted credit is being pumped into 
our markets. There have been some cases of corpo-
ration directors, officers and employees who, through 
deceit . and violation of law, . enriched themselves 
or endangered the financial soundness of their com-
panies to the detriment of their stockholders. 
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Criminals engaged in illegal gambling, skimming, 
!tnd narcotics traffic are operating their financial 
affairs with an impunity that approaches statutory 
exemption. 
"When law enforcement personnel are confronted 
with the secret foreign bank account or the secret 
financial institution they are placed in an impossible 
position. In order to receive evidence and testimony 
regarding activities in the secrecy jurisdiction they 
must subject themselves to a time consuming and 
ofttimes fruitless foreign legal process. Even when 
procedural obstacles are overcome, the foreign juris .. 
dictions rigidly enforce their secrecy laws against 
their own domestic institutions and employees. 
"One of the most damaging effects of an Ameri" 
can's use of secret foreign financial facilities is its 
undermining of the f~irness of our tax laws. Secret 
foreign financial facilities, particularly in Switzer-
land, are available only to the wealthy. To open 
a secret Swiss account normally requires a substan~ 
tial deposit, but such an account offers a convenient 
means of evading U. S. taxes, In these clays when 
the citizens of this country are' crying out for tax 
reform and relief, it is grossly unfair to leave the 
secret foreign bank account open as a convenient 
avenue of tax evasion. The' former U. S. Attorney 
for the Southern District of New York has character-
ized the secret foreign bank account as the largest 
single tax loophole permitted by American law." 
While most of the recordkeeping requirements imposed 
by the Secretary under the Act merely require the banks 
to keep records which most of them had in the past 
voluntarily kept and retained, and while much of the 
required reporting of domestic transactions had been 
required by earlier Treasury regulations in effect for/ 
.• 
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nearly 30 years,2 there is no denying the impressive sweep 
of the authority conferred upon the Secretary of the 
Treasury by the Bank Secrecy Act of 197.0. While an 
Act conferring such broad authority over transactions 
such as these might well surprise or even shock those 
who lived in an earlier era, the latter did not live to see 
the time when bank accounts would join chocolate, 
cheese, and watches as a symbol of the Swiss economy. 
Nor did they live to see the heavy utilization of our· 
domestic banking system by the minions of organized 
crime as well as by millions of legitimate businessmen. 
The challenges made here to the Bank Secrecy Act are 
directed not to any want of legislative authority in Con-
gress to treat the subject, but instead to the Act's asserted· 
violation of specific constitutional prohibitions. 
I 
Title I of the Act, and the implementing regulations· 
.., ..-!"> ......__ 
promuTgated thereunder by the Secretary of the Treasury, 
require financial institutions to maintain records of the 
identities of their · custom~rs, to make microfilm couies 
of certain checks drawn on them, !!lld to keep record_§_of 
certain other items. Title II of the Act ·and its imple-
~entmg regulations req~ eports of certain domestic . 
and foreign currency transactions .. 
A. TITLE I-THE RECORDKEEPING REQUIREMENTS 
Title I of the Bank Secre~y Act contains the gen-- . 
eral recordkeeping requirements for banks and other 
financial institutions, as provided , by the Secretary by 
regulation. Section 101 of the Act, 12 U. S. C. _§ 1829b,. 
applies by its terms only to federally insured banks. It 
contains congressional findings "that adequate records: 
maintained by insured banks have a high degree of use,'"-
2. S.e~ 11. 11, infra, 
r ,. 
"' "\ ' ~ 
72- 985, 72-1073, & 72-1196-0PINION 
CALIFORNIA BANKERS ASSN. v. SHULTZ 7 
fulness in criminal, tax, and regulatory investigations and 
proceedings." The major requirements of the section 
are that insured banks record the identities of persons 
having accounts with them and of persons having signa-
ture authority thereover, in such form as the Secretary 
may require. To the extent that the Secretary deter-
mines by regulation that such records would have the 
requisite "high degree of usefulness," the banks must 
make and maintain microfil m or other reproductions of 
each check, draft, or other instrument drawn on_it and 
presented to it for payment, and must maintain a record 
of each check, draft, or other instrument received by it 
for deposit or collection, together with an identification 
of the party for whose account it is to be deposited or 
collected. Section 101 further authorizes the Secretary 
to require insured banks to maintain a record of the 
identity of all individuals who engage in transactions 
which are reportable by the bank under Title II of the 
Act, and authorizes the Secretary to prescribe the 
required retention period for such records. Section 102, 
12 U. S. C. § 1730d, amends the National Housing Act to 
authorize the Secretary to apply similar recordkeeping 
requirements to institutions insured thereunder. Sec-
tions 121 and 123 of the Act, 12 U. S. C. §§ 1953, 1955, 
authorize the Secretary to issue regulations applying 
similar recordkeeping requirements to additional domestic 
financial institutions.3 
3 Under section 123 (b), the authority of the Secretary extends 
to any per.son engaging in the business of : 
"(1) Issuing or redeeming checks, money orders, travelers' checks, 
or similar instruments, except as an incident to the conduct of its 
own nonfinancial business. 
"(2) Transferring funds or credits domestically or internationally. 
"(3) Operating a currency exchange or otherwise dealing in foreigq 
,currencies or credits. 
" ( 4) Operating a credit card system. 
,. 
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Although an initial draft of Title I, see H. R. 15073, 
91st Cong., 1st Sess., would have compelled the Secretary 
of the Treasury to promulgate regulations requiring 
banks to maintain copies of all items received for collec-
tion or presented for payment, the Act as finally passed 
required the maintenance only of such records and micro-
film copies as the Secretary determined to have a "high 
degree of usefulness." 4 Upon passage of the Act, the 
Treasury Department established a task force which con-
sulted with representatives from financial institutions, 
trade associations, and governmental agencies to deter-
mine the type of records which should be maintained. 
Whereas the original regulations promulgated by the 
Secretary of Treasury had required the copying of all 
checks, the task force decided, and the regulations were 
accordingly amended, to require check copying only as 
to checks in excess of ·$100. 5 The regulations also requir~ 
·' (5) Performing such similar~ related, or substitute functions for 
any of the foregoing or for banking as may be specified by the Secre-
tary in regulations." 
Section 122 of thr Act, 12 U. S. C. § 1954, authorizes the Secre-
tary to require rrports with m,pcct to the ownership, control, and 
management of uninsured domestir financial in~titutions. 
4 See House Hearings, n. 1, supra, at 60--61, 80, 146, 162, 314, 316, 
321, 333; S. Rep. No. 91-1139, supra, at 18-19 (;;upplemental 
views) . 
5 For a summary of the 1ask force st udy, ser Hearings before the 
Subcommittee on Financial Institutions of the Senate Committee 
on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs to amend the Bank Secrecy 
Act (S. 3814), 92d Cong., 2d Ses,;., 60-64 (1972). The SPrretary 
of the Treasury initial!~· issued regulations on April 5, 1972. imple-
menting the provisions of the Act. See 31 C. F . R. Part 103 (37 Fed. 
Reg. 6912). The Treasur~· Department task force found that law 
enforcement would not be greatly impaired by limiting the check-
copying requirement to check,; in excess of $100. An Assistant 
Secretary of the Treasury estimated that this exclusion would 
eliminate 90% of all personal checks from the microfilming re,. 
quirement. Senate Hearings on S. 3814, supra, at 42, 44, 57-58. 
The regulations were tlrn amended shortly after their promulgation 
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the copying of only "on us" checks: checks drawn on 
the bank or issued and payable by it. 31 CFR § 103.34 
(b) (3). The regulations exempt from the copying 
requirements certain "on us" checks such as dividend, 
payroll, and employee benefit checks, provided they are 
drawn on an account expected to average at least one 
hundred checks per month. 6 The regulations also require 
banks to maintain records of the identity and taxpayer 
identification number of each person maintaining a finan-
cial interest in ,each deposit or share account opened after 
June 30, 1972, and to microfilm various other finan-
cial documents. 31 CFR § 103.34.7 In addition, the 
to exclude the copying of checks drawn for $100 or less. 31 CFR 
§ 103.34 (b)(3) , as amended, 37 Fed. Reg. 23114 (1972), 38 Fed . 
Reg. 2174 (1973 ), effective J anuary 17, 1973. 
6 Exempted by 31 CFR § 103.34 (b) (3) are dividend checks, 
payroll checks, employee benefit checks, insurance claim checks, 
medical benefit checks, chPcks drawn on governmental agenry ac-
counts, checks drawn by broker,; or dealers in securit ie;:;, checks· 
drawn on fiduciary accounts, checks drawn on other financial insti-
tutions, and pension or annuity checks, provided they are drawn 
on an account expected to average at least one hundred checks per 
month. 
7 31 CFR § 103.34 (b) requires that e.ach bank retain either the 
original or a microfilm or other copy or reproduction of ( 1) docu-
ments granting signature authority over accounts; (2) statements 
or ledger cards showing transactions in each account ; (3) each item 
involving more than $10,000 remitted OJ transferred to a person, 
account, or place outside the United States; (4) a record of each 
remittance or transact ion of funds, currency, moneta ry instruments, 
checks, investment securit ies, or credit, of more than $10,000 to a 
person, account , or place outside t he United States; (5) each check 
or draft in an amount exceeding ~10,000 drawn on or issued by a. 
foreign bank which the domestic bank has paid or presented to a 
nonbank drawee for payment ; (6) each item of more than $10,000 
received directly from a bank, broker, or dealer in foreign exchange 
outside the United States ; (7) a record of each receipt of currency, 
monetary instruments, clwcks, or investment securities, an,d each 
t:r:rnsfer of funds or credit in amounts exce€ding $10,000 received/ 
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Secretary's regulations require all financial institutions 
to maintain a h1icrofilm or other copy of each extension 
of credit in an amount exceeding $5,000 except those 
secured by interest in real property, and to microfilm 
each advice, request, or instruction given or received 
regarding the transfer of funds, currency or other money 
or credit in amounts exceeding $10,000 to a person, 
account or place outside the United States. 31 CFB, 
§ 103.33. 
Reiterating the stated intent of the Congress, see, e.g., 
H. R. Rep. No. 91-975, supra, at 5; S. Rep. No. 91-1139, 
supra, at 10, the regulations provide that inspection, 
review or access to the records required by the Act to 
be maintained is governed by existing legaI process. 31 
CFR § 103.51.8 Finally, sections 125 through 127 of 
the Act provide for civil and criminal penalties for 
directly from a bank, broker, or dealer in foreign exchange outside 
the United Statrs ; (8) records needed to reconstruct a demand 
deposit account and to trace checks in excess of SlOO deposited in 
such account. 
31 CFR § 103.35 requires brokers and dealers in securities to main-
tain similar information with respect to their brokerage accounts, 
The prescribed retention period for all records under the regula-
tlons is five years, except for the records required for reconstructing 
a demand deposit account, which must be retained for only two 
years. 31 CER § 103.36 (c) . 
8 31 CFR § 103.51 provides: 
"Except as provided in §§ 103.34 (a) (1) and 103.35 (a) (1), and 
except for the purpose of assuring compliance with the record-
keeping and reporting requirements of this part, this part does not 
authorize the Secretary or :my other person to inspect or review 
the records required to be maintained by subpart C of this part. 
Other inspection, review or access to such records is governed by 
other applicable law." 
This regulation became effective January 17, 1973. 37 Fee!. Reg. 
23114 (1972); 38 Fed. Reg. 2174 (1973). 
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willful violations of the recordkeeping requirements. 12 
U. S. C. §§ 1955-1957. 
B. TITLE II-FOREIGN FINANCIAL TRANSACTION 
REPORTING REQUIREMENTS 
Chapter 3 of Title II of the Bank Secrecy Act and the 
regulations promulgated thereunder generally require 
persons to report transportations of monetary instru-
ments into or out of the United States, or receipts of such 
instruments in the United States from places outside the 
United States, if the transportation or receipt involves 
instruments of a value greater than $5,000. Chapter 4 
of Title II of the Act and the implementing regulations 
generally require United States citizens, residents, and 
businessmen to file reports of their relationships with 
foreign financial institutions. The legislative history of 
the foreign transaction reporting provisions indicates that 
the Congress was concerned with the circumvention of 
United States regulatory, tax and criminal laws which 
United States citizens and residents were accomplishing 
through the medium of secret foreign bank transactions. 
S. Rep. No. 91-1139, supra, at 7 _; H . R. Rep. No. 91-975, 
supra, at 13. 
Section 231 of the Act, 31 U. S. C, § 1101, requires 
anyone connected with the transaction to report, in the 
manner prescribed by the Secretary, the transporta-
tion into or out of the country of monetary instru-
ments 9 exceeding $5,000 on any one occasion. As 
9 "Monetary instrument" is defined by section 203 (1) of the Act 
as "coin and currency of the United States, and in addition , such 
foreign coin and currencie:;, and such types of travelers' checks, 
bearer negotiable instruments, bearer investment securities, bearer 
securities, and stock with title passing upon delivery, or the equiv-
alent thereof, as the Secretary may by regulation specify for the 
1mrposes of the provision of this title to which the regulation 
relates." 31 U.S. C. § 1052. 
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provided by the Secretary's regulations, the report must 
include information as to the amount of the instrument, 
the date of receipt, the form of instrument, and the per-
son from whom it was received. See 31 CFR § § 103.23, 
103.25.10 The regulations exempt various classes of per: 
sons from this reporting requirement, including banks, 
brokers or dealers in securities, common carriers and 
others engaged in the business of transporting currency 
for banks. 31 CFR § 103.23 (c). Monetary instru-
ments which are transported without the filing of a 
required report, or with a materially erroneous report, 
are subject to forfeiture under section 232 of the Act, 31 
U. S. C. § 1102; a person who has failed to file the 
required report or who has filed a false report is subject 
to civil penalties under sections 207 and 233, 31 U. S. C. 
§§ 1056, 1103, as well as criminal penalties under sections 
_209 and 210, 31 U. S. C. §§ J058, 1059. 
Section 241 of the Act, 31 U. S. C. § 1121, authorizes 
the Secretary to prescribe regulations requiring residents 
and citizens of the United States, as well as nonresiden'ts 
in the United States and doing business therein, to main-
tain records and file reports with respect to their trans.-
actions and relationships with foreign financial agencies. 
Pursuant to this authority, the regulations require each. 
person subject to the jurisdiction of the United States: 
to make a report on yearly tax returns of any "financial 
interest in, or signature or other authority .over, a bank,. 
10 The form provided by the Treasury Department for the re-
porting of these transactions is Form 4790 (Report of International 
Transportation of Currpncy or Monetary Instruments). See Mo--
tion to Affirm on behalf of 1he Unit€d States in No. 72-985, App. C, 
at 29-30. The report mm;t identify the person required to file the· 
report , his capacity and the identity of persons for whom he acts, 
. and must specify the amounts and types of monetary instruments), 
the method of transportation, and, if applicable, the name of the 
person from whom the shipment was received. 
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securities or other financial account in a foreign country.'; 
31 CFR § 103.24. Violations of the reporting require-
ment of section 241 as implem~nted by the regulations 
are also subject to civil and criminal penalties under sec-
tions 207, 209, and 210 of the Act, 31 U. S. C. §§ 1056, 
1058, 1059. 
C. TITLE II-DOMESTIC FINANCIAL TRANSACTION 
REPORTING REQUIREMENTS 
In addition to the foreign .transaction reporting 
requirements discussed above, Title II of the Bank 
Secrecy Act provides for certain reports of domestic 
transactions where such reports have a high degree of 
usefulness in criminal, tax, or regulatory investigations 
or proceedings. Prior . to the enactment of the Bank 
Secrecy Act, financial institutions had been providing 
reports of their customers1 large currency transactions 
pursuant to regulations promulgated by the Secretary of 
Treasury 11 which had required reports of all currency 
transactions that, in the judgment of the institution, 
exceeded those "commensurate with the customary con-
duct of the business, industry or profession of the person 
©r organization concerned," 12 fn passing the Bank 
11 In issuing these regulations, the Secretary relied upon the 
authority of two statutory provisions: (1) the Trading with the 
Enemy Act, 40 Stat , 411 , as amended by § rz, Act of Mar. 9, 1933, 
c. 1, 48 St~t. 1, and by § 301, First War Powers Act, c. 593, 55 
Stat. 838 ( 1941) . See 12 U. S. C. § 95a (Supp. V, 1940 ed.) ; 
(2) § 251 of the Revised Statutes, 31 U. S. C. § 427. 
12 The previous regulations promulgated b? the Secretary, see 31 
CFR § 102.1 (1949 ed.), 10 Fed. Reg. 6556, originally mentioned 
transactions involving Sl,000 or more jn denominations of $50 or 
more, or Sl0,000 or more in any denominations. In 1952, the 
former amount was raised to $2,500 in denominations of $100 or 
more. See 17 Fed. Reg. 1822, 2306. When these regulations were 
revised in 1959 to simplify the reporting form, tlw Secretary noteq 
the great value of the reports to law enforcement. See Treasury,-
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Secrecy Act, Congress recognized that the use of 6.nanciaJ 
institutions, both domestic and foreign, in furtherance 
of activities designed to evade the regulatory mechanisms 
of the United States, had markedly inc_reased. H . R. 
Rep. No. 91-975, supra, at 10; S. Rep. No. 91-1139, 
supra, at 2-3. Congress recognized the importance of 
reports of large and unusual currency transactions in 
ferreting out criminal activity and desired to strengthen 
the statutory basis for requiring such reports. H. R : Rep. 
No. 91-975, supra, at 11-12. In particular, Congress 
intended to authoriz;e more definite standards for deter-
mining what constitutes the type of unusual transaction 
that should be reported. S. Rep. ~o. 91-1139, suprar 
at 6. 
Section 221 of the Bank Secrecy Act, 31 U.S. C. ~ 1081r 
therefore delegates to the Secretary of the . Treasury the 
authority for specifying the currency transactions whiGh 
should be reported, "if they involve the payment, receipt, 
or transfer of United States currency, or such other mone-
tary instruments as the Secretary may specify." Section 
' 222 of the Act, 31 U. S. C. § 1082, provides that the 
Secretary may require such reports from the domestic 
financial institution involved or the parties to the trans-
actions or both .13 Section 223 of the Act, 31 U. S. C. 
§ 1083, authorizes the Secretary to designate financial 
institutions to receive such reports. 
In the- irµplementing regulations promulgated under 
this authority, the Secretary of the Treasury has required 
only that financial institutions file certain reports with 
the Commissioner of Internal Revenue. The regulations 
require that a report be made for each deposit, with~ 
Release ~o. A-590, August 3, 1959, included in the Jurisdictional 
Statement for the United States in No. 72-1073, App. E, at 
127-130. 
13 The proper interpretation of this section is a source of dispute 
in these appeals . See n. 28, infra. 
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drawal, exchange of currency 14 or other payment ol' 
transfer "which involves a transaction in currency of 
more than $10,000." 31 CFR § 103.22.1 5 The regula-
tions exempt from the reporting requirement certain 
intrabank transactions and "transactions with an estab-
lished customer maintaining a deposit relationship [in 
amounts] commensurate with the customary conduct of 
the business industry or profession of the customer con-
cerned." lbid. 1 0 Provision is also made in the regula-
tions whereby information obtained by the Secretary of 
14 "Currency" is defined in the Secretary ',, regulations as the "coin 
and currency of the United State,; or of any other country, which 
circulate in and are customarily used and accepted as money in 
the country in which issued. It includes United States silver cer-
tificates, United State,, notes and Federal Reserve notes, but does 
not include bank checks or other negotiable in::;truments not cus-
tomarily accepted as money." 31 CFR § 103.11. 
15 The form prescribed by the Secretary, see 31 CFR § 103 .2.5 (a) , 
for the reporting of the domestic currency transactions is Treasury 
Form 4789 (Currency Trnnsaction Report). SPe Jurisdictional 
Statement for the United States in No. 72-1073, App. D, at 121. 
Form 4789 requires information similar to tliat reqrnred by the pre-
vious Treasury reporting form, see n. 12, supra. including (1) the 
name, address, busines,, or profos,,ion- and' social security number · 
of the person conducting the transaction; (2) similar information as 
to the person or organization for whom it was ronducted; (3) a 
summary description of the nature of thf' tram.action, the type, 
amount. and denomination cf the currency involved and a descrip-
tion of any check involved in the transaction ; ( 4) the type of 
identification presented ; and (5) 1.he identity of the reporting finan-
cial institution. 
The regubtion,, al,;o provide that the nam~'S of all customers whose 
currency transactions in excrss of $10,000 are not reported on Form 
4189 must be reported to the Secretary on demand. 31 CFR' 
§ 103.22. 
16 Transaction,; with FedPrnl Re;;erve B:rnks or Federal Home Loan 
Banks, or solely with or originated by financial mstitutions or foreign 
banks, are also excluded from these reporting requirements . 31' 
CFR § 103,22. 
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the Treasury may in some instances and in confidence be 
available to other departments or agencies of the United 
States. 31 CFR ~ 103.43; see 31 U. S. C. § 1061.1.1 
There is also provision made in the regulations whereby 
the Secretary may in his sole discretion make exceptions 
to or grant exemptions from the requirements of the 
regulation. 31 CFR § 103.45 (a).18 Failure to file the 
1.7 Section 212 of the Act , 31 U. S. C. § 1061, authorizes the Serre-
tar~, to provide b~- regulation for the availability of information 
provided in the report8 required b~- the Act to other departments 
and agencies of the Federal Govrrnment. PursLtan1 to thi:; authority, 
the Secretar~- ha:; promulgated 31 CFR § 103.43, which provides : 
"The Secretary may make an~· information set forth in an? report 
received pursuant to this part available to any other department. 
or agenc~- of the United Stntr~ upon the request of the head of 
such department or agenc~·, mride in writing and stating the par-
ticular information det:>ired, the criminal, tax, or regulatory investi-
gation or proceeding in connection with which the information is 
sought, :111d the official need therefor. An~- information made avail-
able undrr thi,; :;ection to othrr department;; or agencies of the 
United States shall be recriwd b~- them in confidence, and shall not. 
br disclo~ed to any person except for official purposes relating to 
the inve;;tigation or proceeding in connection with which the infor-
mation is sought." 
The la;;1 ;;entence of thici regulation was added by an amendment, 
ser 37 Frd. Reg. 23114 (1972) , 38 Fed. Rrg . 2174 (1973), effective 
Januar~- 17, 1973. 
-is 31 CFR § IO:U5 (a) providrs: 
"The Secretar~-, in his ;;olP discretion, may by written order or 
authorization make except10rn; to. or grant exemptions from, the 
rrquirement~ of this part. Such rxcrption~, or exemptions, may be 
conditional or unconditional , ma~· apply to particular persons or to 
classes of per::;ons, and ma~· appl~- to particular transactions or 
classes of transaction:; . They shall, however, be applicable only as 
cxpres:sly :stated in ihe order or authorization, and they shall be 
revocable i11 the sole di:scrrtion of thr Srcrrtar~·-" 
When originally promulgated, this regulation additionally gave the 
Secretar~· the authority to "impose additional recordkeeping or 
reporting requiremr nts authorized b~· statutr, or otherwise modify 
the requirements of" the Act. 37 Fed. Reg. 6912 (1972). The 
72-985, 72-1073, & 72-1196-0PINION 
CALIFORNIA BANKERS ASSN. v. SHULTZ 17 
required report or the filing of a false report subjects the 
banks to criminal and civil penalties. 31 U. S. C. 
§§ 1056, 1058, 1059. 
II 
This litigation began in June 1972 in the United 
States District Court for the Northern District of Cali-
fornia. Various plaintiffs applied for a temporary 
restraining order prohibiting the defendants, including 
the Secretary of the Treasury and heads of other federal 
agencies, from enforcing the provisions of the Bank 
Secrecy Act, enacted by Congress on October 26, 1970, 
and thereafter implemented by the Treasury Regula-
tions. The plaintiffs below included several named 
individual bank customers1 the Security National Bank, 
the California Bankers Association , and the American 
Civil Liberties Union. suing on behalf of itself and its 
various bank customer members. 
The plaintiffs' principal contention in the District 
Court was that the Act and the Regulations were viola-
tive of the Fourth Amendment's guarantee against unrea-
sonable search and seizure, The complaints also alleged 
that the Act violated the First, Fifth, Ninth , Tenth, and 
Fourteenth Amendments, The District Court issued a 
temporary restraining order enjoining the enforcement of 
the foreign and domestic reporting provisions of Title II 
of the Act, and requested the convening of a three-judge 
court pursuant to 28 U. S. C. · 2284 to entertain the 
:myriad of constitutional challenges to the Act. 
The three-judge District Court unanimously upheld 
the constitutionality of the recordkeeping requirements 
of Title I of the Act and the accompanying Regulationsi 
and the requirements of Title II of the Act and the 
Regulations requiring reports concerning the import and 
amendment to the present form became effective January 17, 1973. 
37 Feel. Reg. 23114 (1972) ; 38 Frd. Reg. 2174 (1973). 
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export of currency and monetary instruments and rela-
tionships with foreign financial institutions. The Dis-
trict Court concluded, however, with one judge dissenting, 
that the domestic reporting provisions of sections 221-
223 of Title II of the Act, 31 U. S. C. §§ 1081-1083, were 
repugnant to the Fourth Amendment of the Constitu-
tion. 347 F. Supp. 1242 (1972). The court held tha.t 
since the domestic reporting provisions of the Act per-
mitted the Secretary of the Treasury to require detalfe'"d 
reports of virtually all domestic financial transactions, 
ill£!uding those-iH-volving personal-eheeks-ttnd drafts, and 
since the Act cou!a conce"ivably be administered in such 
a manner as to compel disclosure of all details of a cus-
tomer's financial affairs, the domestic reporting provisions 
must fall on their face as violative of the Fourth Amend-
ment. Their enforcement was enjoined. 
Both the plaintiffs and the Government defendants 
,filed timely notices of appeal from the portions of the 
District Court judgment adverse to them. We noted 
probable jurisdiction over three separate appeals from 
the decision below pursuant to 28 U. S. C. §§ 1252 and 
1253. - u. s. - ( 1973) : 
No. 72-985. The appellant in this appeal 1s the Cali-
fornia Bankers Association, an association of all state 
and national banks doing business in California. The 
Association challenges the constitutionality of the record-
keeping provisions of Title I, as implemented by the regu-
lations, on two grounds. First, the Association contends 
that the Act violates the Due Process Clause of the 
Fifth Amendment because there is no rational rela-
tionship between the objectives of the Act and the• 
recordkeeping required, and because the Act places an 
unreasonable burden on the Association's member banks .. 
Second, the Association contends that the recordkeeping: 
requirements of Title I violate the First Amendment 
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right of privacy and anonymity of the member banks' 
customers. 
No. 72-1196. This appeal was filed on behalf of a 
number of plaintiffs in the original suit ii1 the District 
Court: on behalf of the Security National Bank, on 
behalf of the American Civil Liberties Union as a deposi-
tor in a 6ank subject to the recordkeeping requirements 
and as a representative of its bank customer members, 
and on behalf of certain bank customers. The appeal 
first challenges the constitutionality of the recordkeeping 
requirements of Title I of the Act and the implementing 
regulations, as does the appeal in 72-985, supra. Second, 
the appeal challenges the constitutionality of~~e1~·g..,_n....__:-r/v__ 
financial transaction reporting requirements of Title II of 
the Act and the implementing regulations. These record-
keeping and foreign reporting requirements are challenged 
Qn three grounds: first, that the requirements constitute 
an unreasonable search and seizure in violation of the 
Fourth Amendment ; second, that the requirements con-
stitute a coerced creation and retention of documents in 
violation of the Fifth Amendment privilege against self-
incrimination; and third , that the requirements violate 
the First Amendment rights of free speech and free 
association. 
No. 72-1073. In this appeal, the United States, as 
appellant, challenges that ·portio11 of the District Court's 
order holding the domestic financial transaction reporting 
requirements of Title II to violate the Fourth Amend-
ment. The Government contends that the District 
Court erred in holding these provisions of Title II to be 
unconstitutional on their face, without considering the · 
actual implementation of the statute by . the Treasury 
Regulations. The Government urges th.at since only 
those who violate these regulations may incur civil or · 
criminal penalties, it is the actual regulations issued by 
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the Secretary of the Treasury, and not the broad authorJ 
izing language of the statute, which are to 'be tested 
against the standards of the Fourth Amendment ; and 
that when so tested they . are valid. 
For convenience, we will refer throughout the remain-
der of this opinion to the District Court plaintiffs as 
plaintiffs, since they are both appellants and appellees 
m the appeals filed in this Court. 
III 
We entertain serious doubt as to the standing of th~ 
plaintiff California Bankers Associat;on to litigate tii·e 
claims which it asserts here. Its complaint alleged that 
it is an unincorporated Association consisting of 158 state 
and national banks doing business in California. So far 
as appears from the complaint, the As$ociation is not in 
any way engaged in the banking business, and is not even 
subject to the Secretary's regulations here challenged. 
While the District Court found that the Association sued 
on behalf of its member banks, the Association's com-
plaint contains no such allegation. The Association 
seeks to litigate not only claims on behalf of itis member 
banks, but also claims of injury to the depositors of its· 
member banks. Since the Government has not ques-
tioned the standing of the Association to litigate the 
claims peculiar to banks, and more importantly since 
plaintiff Security National Bank has standing as an 
affected bank, and therefore determination of the Associ-
ation's standing would in no way avoid resolution of any 
constitutional issues, we assume without deciding that 
&he Afspciation does have standinl See Sierra Club_ v. 
Morton, 405 U. S. 727, 739 (1972) ; NAACP v. Button, 
371 u. s. 415, 428 (1963) 
We proceed then to consider the initial contention of 
the bank plaintiffs that the recordkeeping requirements 
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imposed by the Secretary's regulations under the author-' 
ity of Title I deprives the banks of due process by impos-
ing unreasonable burdens upon them, and by seeking to 
make the banks the agents of the Governm~nt in surveil-
lance of its citizens. Such recordkeeping requirements 
are scarcely a novelty. The Internal Revenue Code, for 
example, contains a general authorization to the Secre-
tary of Treasury to prescribe by regulation records to· 
be kept by business and individual taxpayers, 26 U. S. C. 
§ 6001 , which has been implemented by the Secre-
tary in various regulations.rn And this Court has been 
faced with numerous cases involving similar recordkeep-
1ng requirements. Similar requirements imposed on the 
countless businesses subject to the Price Control Act dur-
19 See, e. g., Treas. Reg. § 1.368-3 (records to be kept by tax-
payers who participate in tax-free exchange:; in connection with a 
corporate reorganization); § 1.374-3 (records to be kept by a rail-
road corporation engaging in a tax-free exchange in connection with 
a railroad reorganization) ; § 1.857-6 (real estate investment trusts 
inust keep records of stock ownership) ; § 1.964-3 (shareholders 
must keep records of their interest in a controlled foreign corporation) ; 
§ 1.1101-4 (records must be kept by a stock or security holder 
who receives stock or securltif's or other property upon a dis-
tribution made by a qualified bank holdiiig corporation); § 1.1247-5 
(foreign investment company rriiist keep records sufficient to 
verify what taxable incorrie it may have), § 1.6001-1 (all persons 
liable to tax under subtitle A of the Int . Rev. Code shall keep 
records sufficient to establish gross income, deductions, :rnd credits); 
§ 31.6001 et seq. (requirements that various employers keep records 
of withholding under the Railroad Retirement Tax Act and the 
Federal Unemployment Tax Act); § 45.6001 (records to be kept 
by manufacturers of butter and cheese), § 46.6001 (records to be 
kept by manufacturers of sugar); § 46.6001-4 (records to be kept by 
persons paying premiums on policies issued by foreign insurers) . 
Treas. Reg. § 301.7207-1 provides for criminal penalties for willfl.ii 
delivery or disclosure to the Internal Revenue Service of a document 
known by the person disclosing it to be false as to any mater_iai 
matter. 
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ing the Second World War were upheld in Shapiro v. 
United States, 335 U. S. 1 (1948). the Court observing 
that there was "a sufficient relation between the activity 
sought to be regulated and the public concern so that the 
Government can constitutionally regulate or forbid the 
basic activity concerned, and can constitutionally require 
the keeping of particular records. subject to inspec-
tion .... " Id., at 32. In United States v. Darby, 312 
U. S. 100 (1941), the Court held that employers subject 
to the Fair Labor Standards Act could be required to 
keep records of wages paid and hours worked . 
"Since, as we have held, Congress may require pro-
duction for interstate commerce to conform to [ wage 
and hour] conditions, it may require the employer, 
as a means of enforcing the valid law, to keep a 
record showing whether he has in fact complied with 
it." Id., at 125. 
We see no reason to reach a different result here. The 
plenary authority of Congress over both interstate and 
foreign commerce is not open to dispute, and that body 
was not limited to any one particular approach to effec-
tuate its concern that negotiable instruments moving in 
the channels of that commerce were significantly aiding 
criminal enterprise. The Secretary of the Treasury, 
authorized by Congress, concluded that copying and 
retention of certain negotiable instruments by the bank 
upon which they were drawn would facilitate the detec-
tion and apprehension of participants in such criminal 
enterprises. Congress could have closed the channels of 
commerce entirely to negotiable instruments, had it 
thought that so drastic a solution were warranted; it 
could have made the transmission of the proceeds of any 
criminal activity by negotiable instruments in interstate 
, or foreign commerce a separate criminal offense, Had 
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it chosen to do the latter, under the precise authority of 
Darby or Shapiro, supra, it could have required that each 
individual engaging in the sending of negotiable instru-
ments through the channels of commerce maintain a 
record of such action; the bank plaintiffs concede as 
much.20 
The bank plaintiffs contend, however, that the Act 
does not have as its primary purpose regulation of the 
banks themselves, and therefore the requirement that 
the banks keep the records is an unreasonable burden on t.,/ 
t.be banks. Shapiro and Darby, which involved legisla-
tion imposing recordkeeping requirements in aid of sub-
stantive regulation , are therefore said not to controT. 
But provisions requiring reporting or recordkeeping by 
the paying institution, rather than the individual who 
receives the payment, are by no means unique. The 
Internal Revenue Code and its regulations, for example, 
contain provisions which require businesses to report in-
come payments to third parties ci26 U. S. C. § 6041 (a)). 
7
.,---
employers to keep records of certain payments made to · 
employees (Treas. Reg. § 31.6001) , corporations to report 
dividend payments made to third parties (26 U. S. C. 
§ 6042) , cooperativc?to report patronage dividend pay-
ments (26 U. S. C. § 6044), brokers to report customer~ 
gains and losses (26 U. S. C. § 6045) , and banks to report 
payments of interest made to depositors (26 U. S. C. 
§ 6049). 
In Darby an identifiable class of employer was made 
subject to the Fair Labor Standards Act, and in Shapiro 
an identifiable class of businesses had been placed under 
the Price Control Act; in each of those instances, Con-
gress found that the purpose of its regulation was ade-
quately secured by requiring records to be kept by the 
20 Brief for Appellant Califorma Bankers Association rn No. 72-985, 
at 25. 
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persons subject to the substantive commands of the 
legislation. In this case, however, Congress determined 
that recordkeeping alone would suffice for its purposes, 
and that no correlative substantive legislation was re-
quired. Neither this fact, nor the fact that the principal 
nongressional concern is with the activities of the banks' 
customers, rather than with the activities of the banks 
themselves, serve to invalidate the legislation on due 
process grounds. 
The bank plaintiffs proceed from the premise that 
they are complete bystanders with respect to transactions 
involving drawers and drawees of their negotiable in-
struments. But such is hardly the case. A voluminous 
body of law has grown up defining the rights of the 
drawer, the payee, and the drawee bank with respect to 
various kinds of negotiable instruments. The recogni-
tion of such rights, both in the various States of this 
country and in other countries, is itself a part of the 
reason why the banking business has flourished and 
played so prominent a part in commercial transactions. 
The bank is a party to any negotiable instrument drawn 
upon it by a depositor, and upon acceptance or payment 
of an instrument incurs obligations to the payee. While 
it obviously is not privy to the background of a transac-
tion in which a negotiable instrument is used, the existing 
wide acceptance and availability of negotiable instru-
ments is of inestimable benefit to the banking industry 
as well as to commerce in general. 
Banks are therefore not conscripted neutrals in trans-
actions involving negotiable instruments, but parties to 
the instruments with a substantial stake in their con-
tinued availability and acceptance. Congress not illog-
ically decided that if records of transactions of negotiable 
instruments were to be kept and maintained, in order 
to be available as evidence under customary legal process 
if the occasion warranted, the bank was the most easily 
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identifiable party to the instrument and therefore should 
do the recordkeeping. We believe this conclusion is con-
sistent with Darby and Shapiro, and that there is a 
sufficient connection between the evil Congress sought 
to address and the recordkeeping procedure it required 
to pass muster under the Due Process Clause of the 
Fifth Amendrnent.21 
The bank plaintiffs somewhat halfheartedly argue, on 
the basis of the costs which they estimate will be incurred 
by the banking industry in complying with the Secre-
21 Congress had before it ample testimon~· that t he requirement 
that banks reproduce checks and maintain other records would 
significantly aid in the enforcement of federal tax, regulatory, and 
criminal laws. See House Hearings, n. 1, supra, at 151, 322, 359; 
Senate Hearings, n. 1, supra, at 61-68, 175, 230, 250-255, 282. 
While a substantial portion of the checks drawn on banks in the 
United States may never be of any utility for law enforcement, tax 
or regulatory purposes, the regulations do limit the check-copying 
requirement to checks in excess of $100. 31 CFR § 103 .34 (b) (3) 
and ( 4). This $100 except ion was added to the regulations since 
this litigation wns instituted, see n. 5, supra; in reviewing the 
j"udgment of the District Court in this case, we look to the statute· 
and the regulations as they now stand, not as they once did. Hall v. 
Beal,s, 396 U. S. 45, 48 (1969) (per euriam); Thorpe v. Housing 
A,tthority, g93 U. S. 268, 281 n. 3"8 (1969). 
The California Bankers A~socfation contends that the $100 excep-
tion is meaningless since microfilin cameras cannot discriminate · 
between checks in different nmounts. There wns, however, testimony 
during the House Hearings that an additional step could be added 
to the check-handling procedures to sort ollt those checks not 
required to be copied, and that many banks have equipment that 
oan sort checks on a dollar-amount basis. House Hearings, n. l , 
supra, at 322, 359. In any eYent, it is clear that the Act and 
regulations do not require banks to microfilm all checks, which some 
banks have traditionally done, but instead leaves the decision to the 
banks. Given the fact that the cost burdens placed on the banks 
ih implementing the recordkeeping requirements of the statute and · 
regulations are also reascnable ones, see n. 22, infra , we do not.' 
thitil( that the re:cor.dkeening requirements , are unreasonable:~ 
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tary's recordkeeping requirements, that this cost burden 
alone deprives tnem of tne process ot law. 'l'ney cite no 
cases for this proposition, and 1t does not warrant ex-
tended treatment. In its complamt filed in the District 
Court, plaintiff Security National Bank asserted that it 
was an "insured" national bank; to the extent that Con-
gress has acted to require records on the part ot banks 
1nsured by the }iederal Deposit lnsurance l;orporation, 
or of financial inst1tut10ns msured under the l'iat10nal 
Housing Act: l;ongress 1s s1mp1y 1mposmg a condit1011 
on the spendmg of publlc tunds. 1:;ee, e. g., Steward 
Macnine Uo. v. lJaV?,s, 301 U. S. b48 p9;f,) ; Helvering 
v. Davis, 301 U. S. tH9 (1931 ) . Smee tnere was no 
allegat1011 m the complamts .tiled m tne LJistnct l,ourt, 
nor 1s 1t contended nere tnat any bank p1amtrt1 is not 
~overed by .J!"lJH..; or nousmg Act 111suranee, 1t 1s un-
necessary to consider what questions wou1<:t. anse natl 
Congress relied solely upon its power over rnterstate 
commerce to impose tne recorairnepmg requirements. 
The cost burdens imposed on tne banKs by tne record-
keepmg requll'ements are tar trom unreasonable, and we 
hold tnat such burdens do not deny tne banks due. 
process of law. 22 
2 " The only figures in the record as to the cost burdens placed on 
the banks by tne recorctkeeping requirements snow tnat we bank 
of America, one of the largest oanks in tne United .::itates, with !:l97 
branches, :.:!9 billion dollart; in deposits and a net income in excess 
of 178 million do!Jars (Moody's bank and .r inance Manual ( 1972) , 
{lt 633-636), expended 392 thousand dollars in 1971, including start-. 
up cost::., to comply wit11 the microfilmmg requirements ot .1itle I 
Qf the Act. Affidavit of William Ehler, App. 24-25. 
The hearings before the House Committee on Banking and Cur-
rency indicated that the cost of making microfilm copies of checks 
ranged from 1½ mills per check for small banks down to about ½ 
mi,11 or less for large banks. See Ho1;1se Hearings, n. 1, supra, at 
341, 354-356; H. Rep. No. 91-975, supra, at 11. The House Report 
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The bank plaintiffs also contend that the record 4 
keeping requirements imposed by the Secretary pursu-
ant to the Act undercut a depositor's right to effectively 
thallenge a third-party summons issued by the Internal 
Revenue Service. See Reisman v. Caplin, 375 U. S. 
440 (1964); Donaldson v. United States, 400 U. S. 517 
( 1970); Couch v. United States, 409 U. S. 322 ( 1973) . 
"\Vhatever wrong such a result might work on a depositor, 
it works no injury to his bank. It is true that in a 
limited class of cases this Court has permitted a party 
who suffered injury as a result of the operation of a law 
to assert his rights even though the sanction of the law 
was borne by another, Pierce v. Society of S-isters , 268 
U. S. 510 (1925), and conversely, the Court has allowed 
a party upon whom the sanction falls to rely on the 
wrong done to a third party in obtaining relief, Barrows 
V. Jackson, 346 U. S. 249 (1953); Eisenstadt v. Baird, 
405 U.S. 438 (1972). Whether the bank might in other 
circumstances rely on an injury to its depositors, or 
whether instead this case is governed by the general rule 
that one has standing only to vindicate his own rights, 
e. g., Moose Lodge v. lrvis, 407 U. S. 163, 166 ( 1972) , 
need not now be decided , since, in any event, the claim 
is premature. Claims of depositors against the compul-
sion by lawful process of bank records involving the 
depositors' own transactions must wait until such process 
issues. 
Certain of the plaintiffs below, appellants in No. 72-
1196, including the American Civil Liberties Union, the 
Security National Bank, and various individual plaintiff 
depositors, argue that "the dominant purpose of an Act 
f!Jrthcr indicates that the legislation was not expected to significantly 
increase th" costs of the banks involved since it was found that 
many banks already followrd the practice of maintaming the record~ 
contemplated by the legislat10n. 
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is the creation, preservation, and collection of evidence of 
crime [and] .. .. [i]t is against the standards applicable 
to the criminal law, then, that its constitutionality must 
be measured." They contend that the re8'?rdkeepiu~ lie· 
g,uicewcats •• iolate the 1mwisians of the Fomtb, Ei,f.th, 
and First Amendments ta the Constitution. At this 
point, we deal only with such constitutional challenges 
as they relate to the recordkeeping provisions of Title I 
of the Act. 
We see nothing in the Act which violates the Fourth I / 
Amendment rights of any of these plaintiffs. Neither 
the provisions of Title I !!2!:. the implementing regula-
tions reguire t.hat 1m3c iu£oi;i..otiw coutoiuocJ ilil tbe 1-fC- ~ 
ords be disclosed to the Gqyernruent,; both the legislative 
history and the regulations make specific reference to the 
fact that access to the records is to be controlled by 
existing legal process. 
Plaintiffs urge that when the bank makes and keeps 
records under the compulsion of the Secretary's regula-
tions it acts as an agent of the Government, and thereby 
engages in a "seizure" of the records of its customers. 
But all of the records which the Secretary requires to be 
kept pertain to transactions to which the bank was itself 
a party. The fact that a large number of banks volun-
tarily kept records of this sort before they were required 
to do so by regulation is an indication that the records 
were thought useful to the bank in the conduct of its 
own business, as well as in reflecting transactions of its 
customers. We decided long ago that an Internal Reve-
nue summons directed to a third-party bank was not a 
violation of the Fourth Amendment rights of either the 
bank or the person under investigation by the taxing 
authorities. See First National Bank v. United States, 
267 U. S. 576 ( 1925) , aff'g 295 Fed. 142 (SD Ala. 1924) ; 
Donaldson v. United States, 400 U. S. 517, 522 (1971) . 
"[I]t is difficult to see how the summoning of a third 
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party, and the records of a third party, can violate the 
rights of the taxpayer, even if a criminal prosecution is 
contemplated or in progress." Donaldson v. United 
States, supra, at 537 (DouGLAS, J., concurring). 
Plaintiffs nevertheless contend that the broad author-
ization given by the Act to the Secretary to require the 
maintenance of records, coupled with the broad authority 
to require certain reports of financial transactions, 
a:uionu±@ ts 1'ft@ J]8nrer to ccwwit e.R nnleurfnl sea.wh of 
the banks and the customers. This argument is based 
on the fact that 31 CFR § 103.45, as it existed when the 
District Court ruled in the case, permitted the Secretary 
to impose additional recordkeeping or reporting require-
ments by written order or authorization; this authority 
has now been deleted from the regulation ; n plaintiffs 
thus argue that the Secretary could order the immediate 
reporting of any records made or kept under the compul-
sion of the Act. We of course must examine the statute 
and the regulations as they now exist. Hall v. Beals, 
396 U.S. 45, 48 (1969) (per curiam) ; 1'horpe v. Housing 
Authority, 393 U. S. 268, 281 n. 38 (1969). Even if 
plaintiffs were correct in urging that we decide the case 
on the basis of the regulation as it existed at the time the 
District Court ruled, their contention would be without 
merit. Whatever the Secretary might have authorized 
under the regulation, h~did not in fact require the 
r~ortjpg of a:ux rncorqs ade oc kept nnder the com-
pp)sjon of the A_ct. Indeed, since the legislative history 
of the Act clearly indicates that records which it autho;-
ized the Secretary to require were to be available only 
by normal legal process, it is doubtful that the Secretary 
would have the authority ascribed to him by appellants 
even under the earlier form of the regulation. But in 
any event, whether or not he had the authority, he did 
23 See n. 18, supra. 
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not exercise it, and in fact none of tbe i:ecotds wer!L~ 
r29uired to be repo;!ed. Since we hold that the mere 
waiuteuauce a{ tbe records by the bank under the com-
P.Ulsion tions invaded no Fourth Amendment 
right of any depositor 1 plaintiffs' attac on e r d-
..-keeping requirements under that Amendment fails.24 
That the bank in making the records required by the 
Secretary acts under the compulsion of the regulation is 
clear, but it is equally clear that in doing so it neither 
searches nor seizes records in which the depositor has a 
Fourth Amendment right. · 
Plaintiffs have briefed their contentions in such a way 
that we cannot be entirely certain whether their Fifth 
Amendment attack is directed only to the reporting pro-
visions of the regulations, or to the recordkeeping pro-
visions as well. . To the extent that it is directed to 
the regulations requiring the banks to keep records, -it 
is without merit. Incorporated banks, like other orga-
nizations, have no privilege against self-incrimination, 
e. g., Hale v. Henkel, 201 U.S. 43, 74-75 (1906); Wflson 
24 Chapter 4 of the Act, section 241, 31 U. S. C. § 1121 , authorizes 
the Secretary to by regubtion require the maintenance of records 
by persons who engage in any transaction or maintain a relation-
ship, directly or indirectly, on behalf of themselves or others, with a 
foreign financial agency. The Secretary has by regulation required 
the maintenance of such records by persons having such financial 
interests and by domestic financial institutions who engage in 
monetary transactions outside the United States. 31 CFR §§ 103.32, 
103.33. The Act also provides that production of such records shall 
be compelled only by "a subpena or summons duly authorized and 
is.sued or as may otherwirn be required by law." 31 U. S. C. 
§ 1121 (b) . Though it is not apparent from the various briefs filed 
in this Court by the plaintiffs below whether this particular record-
keeping requirement is challenged, our holding that a mere require-
ment that records be kept does not violate any constitutional right 
of the banks or of the depositors necessarily_ disposes of such a 
claim, since there is no indication at this point that there has been 
any attempt to coi:npel the productton of such records. 
L- .. 
ll ~ 
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v. United States, 221 U. S. 361, 382-384 (1911); United 
S,tates v. White, 322 U. S. 694, 699 (1944), and a party 
incriminated by evidence produced by a third party may 
not complain of a violation of his own Fifth Amendment 
rights. Johnson v. United States, 228 U. S. 457, 458 
(1913); Couch v. United States, 409 U. S. 322, 328 
(1973). 
Plaintiff ACLU makes an additional challenge to the 
recorakeeping requirements of Title I. It argues that 
those provisions, and the implementing regulations, 
violate its members' First Amendment rights, since the 
I 
provisions could possibly be used to obtain the identities 
of its members and contributors through the examination 
of the organization's bank records. This Court has 
recognized that an organization may have standing to 
assert that constitutional rights of its members to be 
protected from governmentally compelled disclosure of 
their membership in the organization, and that absent a 
countervailing governmental interest, such information 
may not be compelled. NAACP v. Alabama, 357 U. S. 
440 (1958). See Pollard v. Roberts, 283 F. Supp. 258 
(ED Ark. 1968) , aff'd per curiam, 393 U. S. 14 (1968). 
Those cases, however, do not elicit a per se rule that 
would forbid such disclosure in a situation where the 
governmental interest would override the associational 
interest in maintaining such confidentiality. Each of 
them was litigated after a subpoena or summons had 
already been served for the records of the organization, 
and an action brought by the organization to prevent the 
actual disclosure of the records.25 No such disclosure 
25 The ACLU recognizes that these cases, and the other cases 
it cites involved -~ituat ions in which a subpoena or summons had 
already issued. Brief for the Appellant ACLU in No. 72-1196, 
at 57. See Lamont v. PostmaaSter General, 381 U. S. 301 (1965); 
Gibson v. Florida Legislative Investigations Comm ., 372 U. S. 539 
(1963); Louisiana ex rel . Gremillion v. NAACP, 366 U. S. 29~ · 
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been sought by the Government here, and ,th,,t,! 
refore premature. This Court, 
in:::t~ e::.;a~se:;.n;;::c:.:.e.:;:.:.:.o~f ~a...!.l<co~1.,..1c""r"-e~t:.:.e~f;..:a;:,.c.;.t :.:s.::1 ~u:::a:;:.;.:10n in which com-
peting associational and governmental interests can be 
weighed, is simply not in a position to determine whether' 
an effort to compel disclosure of such records would or 
would not be barred by cases such as NAACP v. Alabama, 
supra. 26 The threat to any First Amendment rights of 
the ACLU or its members from the mere existence of 
the records in the hands of the bank is a good deal more 
remote than the threat assertedly posed by the Army s 
systemo'f 60nrpilat10n and dtstnout10n of mformation 
which we declined to adj udicate in Laird v. Tatu;,,, 408 
u. s. 1 (1972). 
IV 
We proceed now to address the constitutional chal-
lenges directed at the reporting requirements of the 
regulations authorized in Title II of the Act. Title II 
authorizes the Secretary to require reporting of two gen-
(1961); Shelton v. Tucker, 364 U. S. 479 (1960); Bates v. Little 
Rock, 361 U. S. 516 (1960); NAACP v. Alabama, 357 U. S. 449 
(1958) ; United States v. Rumley, 345 U. S. 41 (1953). 
26 The ACLU contends that present injunctive relief is essent ial, 
since the banks might not notify it of the fact that their records 
have been subpoenaed, and might comply with the subpoena with-
out giving the ACLU a chance to obtain judicial review. While 
noting that "most banks formally prohibit" it ( citing American 
Banker, May 12, 1972, p. 1, cols. 3-4), the ACLU also contends 
that the "day-to-day practice of permitting 'informal ' access to bank 
records is, unfortunately, widespread." Brief for Appellant ACLU 
in No. 72-1196, at 58--59. 
The record contains no showing of any attempt by the Govern-
ment, formal or informal , to compel the production of bank records 
containing information relating to the ACLU; we accordingly ex-
press no opinion whether notice would in $UCh an instance be requireq 
by either the Act or the Constitution. 
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eral categories of banking transactions: foreign and do-
mestic. The District Court upheld the constitutionality 
of the foreign transaction reporting requirements of reg-
ulations issued under Title II; certain of the plaintiffs 
below, appellants in No. 72-1196, have appealed from that 
portion of the District Court's judgment, and here renew 
their contentions of constitutional infirmity in the for-
eign reporting regulations _based upon the First, Fourth, 
nnd Fifth Ame11dments. The District Court invalidated 
the Bank Secrecy Act insofar as it authorized the Secre-
tary to promulgate regulations requiring banks to report 
domestic transactions involving their customers, and the 
Government in No. 72-1073 apeals from that portion of 
the District Court's judgment. 
As noted above, the regulations issued by the Secretary 
tinder the authority of Title II contain two essential 
reporting requiremehts with respect to foreign financial' 
transactions. Chapter 3 of Title II of the Act, 31 U.S. C. 
~ 1101-1105, and the corresponding regulation, 31 CFR 
§ 103.23, require individuals to report transportation of 
monetary instruments into or out of the United States, 
or receipts of such instruments in the United States 
from places outside the U~ited. s·tates, if the instrument 
transported or received has a value in excess of $5,000. 
Chapter 4 of Title II of the Act, 31 U. S. C. ~ 1121-1122, 
and the corresponding regulation, 31 CFR § 103.24, gen-
erally require United States citizens, residents, and busi-
nessmen to file reports of their relationships with foreign 
financial institutions. 
The domestic r Jorting provisions of the Act as imple-
mente 'by the regu at10ns, in contrast to the foreign 
reporting requirements, apply only to banks and finan-
cial institutions. In enacting the statute, Congress pro-
vided in section 221, 31 U.S. C. § 1081, that the Secretary . 
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might specify the types of currency transactions which 
should be reported: 
"Transactions involving any domestic financial in::-
stitution shall be reported to the Secretary at such 
t ifne, 11  such ·manner, and in such detail as the 
Secretary may require if they involve the payment, -receipt, or transfer of United States currency, or 
such other monetary- instruments as the Secretary 
may specify, in such amounts, denominations, or 
both, o r~ nder such circumstances, as the Secretary 
shall by regulation prescribe." 
Section 222 of the Act, 31 U. S. C. § 1082, al!,thorizes the 
Secretary to require such reports from the domestic fi-
nancial instit~ ion mvolved, from the parties to the 
transactions, or from both. In exercising his authority 
under these sections, the Se~retary has promulgated 
regulations which require on!Y that the financial insti-
tutiorismake the report to tneinternal Revenue Service; 
hifas not regmred !:ny report from tfie md1v1dual par-
ties to domestic financial transac t ions.21 The applicable 
regulation , 31CFR § 103.22, requires the financial insti-
·tution to "file a report on each deposit, withdrawal, 
exchange of currency or other payment or transfer, by, 
through, or to such financial institution, which involves 
a transaction in currency of more than $10,000." The 
regulation exempts several types of currency transactions 
from this reporting requirement, including transactions 
"within an established customer maintaining a deposit 
relationship with the bank, in amounts which the banks 
may reasonably conclude do not exceed amounts com-
mensurate with the customary conduct of the business, 
· industry or profession of the customer concerned." lb-id, 
· 27 See n. 28, infra . 
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A. FOURTH AMENDMJ<JNl' CHALLENGE TO THE FOREIGN 
REPORTING REQUIREMENTS 
The District Court, in differentiating for constitutional 
purposes between the foreign reporting requirements and 
the domestic reporting requirements imposed by the Sec-
retary, relied upon our opinion in United States v. 
United States District Court, 407 U. S. 297 ( 1972), for 
the proposition that Government surveillance in the area 
of foreign relations is in some instances subject to less 
constitutional restraint than would be similar activity 
in domestic affairs. Our analysis does not take us over 
this ground. 
The plenary authority of Congress to regulate foreign 
commerce, and to delegate significant portions of this 
power to the Executive, is well-established. C & S Air~ 
lines v. Waterman Corp., 333 U.S. 103, 109 (1048); 
Norwegian Nitrogen Products Co. v. United States, 288 
U. S. 294 ( 1933). Plaintiffs contend that in exercising 
that authority to require reporting of previously de-
scribed foreign financial transactions, Congress and the 
Secretary have abridged their Fourth Amendment rights. 
The familiar language of the Fourth Amendment pro-
tects "the right of the people to be secure in their 
persons, houses, papers and effects against unreasonable 
searches and seizures . ... " Since a statute requiring 
the filing and subsequent publication of a corporate tax 
return has been upheld against a Fourth Amendment 
challenge, Flint v. Stone Tracy Co., 220 U. S. 107, 174-
176 ( 1911) , reporting requirements are by no means 
per se violations of the Fourth Amendment. Indeed, 
a contrary holding might well fly in the face of the 
'Settled sixty-year history of self-assessment of individual 
and corporate income___ taxes in the United States. This 
Cqurt has on numerous occasions recognized the im~ 
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"Aortance of the self-regulatory aspects of that system1 
and interests of the Congress in enforcing it : 
"In assessing income taxes the Government relies 
primarily upon the disclosure by the taxpayer of the 
relevant facts. This disclosure it requires him to 
make in his annual return. To insure full and 
honest disclosure, to discourage fraudulent attempts 
to evade the tax, Congress imposes sanctions. Such 
sanctions may confessedly be either criminal or civil. 
Helvering v. Mitchell ; 303 U. S. 391 , 399 (1938) . 
To the extent that the reporting requirements of the 
Bank Secrecy Act and the settled practices of the tax 
collection process are similar, this history must be over-
come by those who argue that the reporting requirements 
are a violation of the Fourth Amendment. Plaintiffs 
contend, however, that Boyd v. United States, 116 U. S. 
616 (1886), establishes the invalidity of the foreign re-
porting requirement under the Fourth Amendment, and 
that the particular requirements imposed are so indis-
criminate in their nature that the regulations must be 
deemed to be the equivalent of a general warrant of the 
kind condemned as obnoxious to the Fourth Amend-
ment in cases such as Stanford v. Texas, 379 U. S. 476 
( 1965). We do not think these cases would suppoD 
plaintiffs even if their contentions were directed ai ±1.e 
domestic reporting requirements; in light of the fact that 
the foreign reporting reqmremP-nts deal with matters in 
foreign commerce, we think plaintiffs' reliance on the 
cases to challenge those requirements must fail. 
Boyd v. United States, supra, is a case which has been 
the subject of repeated citation, discussion, and explana-
tion since the time of its decision 88 years ago. In 
Qommunist Party v. SACB, 367 U.S. 1 (1961 ), the Court 
described the Boyd holding as follows : 
"The Boyd case involved a statute providing that , 
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in proceedings other than criminal arising under th~ 
revenue laws, the Government could secure an order 
t>f the court requiring the production by an opposing 
claimant or defendant of any documents under his 
control which, the Government asserted, might tend 
to prove any of the Government's allegations. If 
production were not made, the allegations were to 
be taken as confessed. On the Government's 
motion, the District Court had entered such an 
order, requiring the claimants in a forfeiture pro-
ceeding to produce a specified invoice. Although 
the claimants obje'Cted that the order was improper 
and the statute unconstitutional in coercing self .. 
incriminatory disclosures and permitting unreason-
able searches and seizures, they did, under protestj 
produce the invoice, which was, again over their 
·constitutional obj'ection,. Admitted· into evidence. 
This Court held that 011 such a record a judgment 
for the United States could not stand, and that the 
statute was invalid as repugnant to the Fourth and 
Fifth Amendments.!' 36/f U. S. 1, 110. 
But the Boyd Court recognized tha.t the Fourth Amend-
ment does not prohibit all requirements that information 
be made available to the~ Government : 
"[T]he supervision authorized to be exercised by 
officers of the revenue over the manufacture or cus-
tody of excisable articles, and the entries thereof in 
books required by law to be kept for their inspec-
tion, are necessarily excepted out of the category of 
unreasonable searches and seizures." 116 U. S. 616, 
623-624. 
Stanford v. Texas, supra, involved a warrant issued by 
a state judge which described petitioner's home and 
authorized the search and seizure of "books, records, 
_pamphlets, cards, receipts, lists, memoranda, pictures,. 
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recordings and other written instruments concerning the 
Communist Party of Texas." This Court found the 
·warrant to be an unconstitutional general warrant, and 
invalidated the search and seizure conducted pursuant 
to it. Unlike the situation in Stanford, the Secretary's 
regulations do not authorize indiscriminate rummaging 
among the records of the plaintiffs. nor do the reports 
they require deal with literary material as in Stanford; 
the information sought is about commerce, not litera-
ture. The reports of foreign financial transactions 
required by the regulations must contain information as 
to a relatively limited group of financial transactions in 
foreign commerce, and are reasonably related to the-
statutory purpose of assisting in the enforcement of the-
laws of the United States. 
Of primary importance, in addition, is the fact that 
the information requiretl'by the foreign reporting require-
ments pertains only to @mmercial transactions which 
take lace · nal b s. Chief Justice 
a t , in his opinion for the Court in Carroll v. United 
States, 267 U. S. 132 (1925 ), observed : 
"Travellers may be so stopped in crossing an inter-
national boundary because of national selfprotection 
reasonably requiring one entering the country to, 
identify himself as entitled to come in, and his 
belongings as effects which may be lawfully brought 
in." Id ., at 154. 
This settled proposition has been reaffirmed as recently 
as last Term in Almeida-Sanchez v. United States , 413 
U . S. 266, 272 (1,973). If reporting of income may be 
required as an aid to enforcement of the federal revenue 
statutes, and if those entering and leaving the country 
may be examined as to their belongings and effects, all 
without violating the Fourth Amendment, we see no, 
:ct')asqn to i_nvalidate the Secretary's regulations here~ 
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The statutory authorization for the regulations was based 
upon a conclusion by Congress that international cur-
rency transactions and foreign financial institutions were 
being used by residents of the United States to circum-
vent the enforcement of the laws of the United States. 
The regulations are sufficiently tailored so as to single 
out transactions found to have the greatest potential for 
fi
such circumvention and which involve substantial 
ounts of money. They are therefore reasonable in 
light of that statutory purpose, and consistent with 
the Fourth Amendment. 
B. FOURTH AMENDMENT CHALLENGE TO THE DOMESTIC -R EPORTING REQUIREMENTS 
The District Court examined the domestic reporting 
requirements imposed on plaintiffs by looking to the 
broad authorization of the Act itself, without specific 
reference to the regulations promulgated under its 
authority. The District Court observed : 
"[A]lthough to date the Secretary has required 
reporting only by the financial institutions and then 
only of CJ!:J.:!J:!fCY transactions over $10,000, he is 
empowered ·by the Act, as indicated above, to require, 
if he so decides, reporting-not only by the financial 
institution, but also by ot.her , parties to or partici-
pants in transactions with the ins~itutions and, fur-
ther, that the Secretary may require reports, not 
only of currency transactions but of any transaction 
involving any monetary instr~ ent-and m a~iy 
amount-large or Sg).all." 347 F . Supp., at 1246. 
1 
. The District Court went on to pose, as the question 
to be resolved, whether "these provisions, broadly 
authorizing an executive agency of government to , 
require financial institutions and parties [thereto] to , 
routinely report . . . the detail of almost every conceiv-
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able financial transaction . . . [ are J such an invasion of 
a citizen's right of privacy as amounts to an unreasonable 
search and seizure within the meaning of the Fourth 
Amendment." Ibid. 
Since, as we have observed earlier in this opinion, the - -statut€ is not self-executing, and were the Secretary to 
take no action whatever under his authority there would 
be no possibility of criminal or civil sanctions being 
imposed on anyone, the District Court was wrong in 
framing the question in this manner. 'l'he question is 
not what sort o1 reporting requirements might have been 
imposed by the Secretary under th€ broad authority given 
him in the Act, but rather what sort of reporting require-
ments did he in fact impose under that authority. 
"Even where some of the provisions of a compre-
hensive legislative enactment are ripe for adjudica~ 
tion, portions of the enactment not immediately 
involved are not thereby thrown open for a judicial 
determination of constitutionality. 'Passing upon 
the possible significance of the manifold provisions 
of a broad statute in advance of efforts to apply the 
separate provisions is analogous to rendering an 
advisory opinion upon a statute or a declaratory 
judgment upon a hypothetical case. ' Watson v. 
Buck, 313 U. S. 387, 402. " Communu,t Party v. 
SACB, supra, 367 U. S., at 71. 
· The question for decision, therefore, is whether the 
r~ulations relating to the reporting of d omestic;'° trans-
actions, violations of which could subject those required 
· to report to civil or criminal penalties, invade any F (!urth 
Amendment right of those required to report. To that 
question we now turn. 
The regulations issued by the Secretary require the 
reporting of domestic financial transactions only by 
financial institutions. United States v. Morton Salt Co,
1 
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338 U. S. 632 (1950), held that organizations engaged 
in commerce could be required by the Government to file 
reports dealing with particular phases of their activities. 
The language used by the Court in that case is instructive: 
"It is unnecessary here to examine the question 
of whether a corporation is entitled to the protec-
tion of the Fourth Amendment._ Cf. Oklahoma 
Press Publishing Co. v. Walling, 327 U. S. 186. 
Although the 'right to be let alone-the most com-
prehensive of rights and the right most valued by 
civilized men,' Brandeis, J., dissenting in Olmstead 
v. United States, 277 U. S. 438, 471 , at 478, is not 
confined literally to searches and seizures as such,. 
but extends as well to the orderly taking under com-
pulsion of process, Boyd v. United States, 116 U. S. 
616, Hale v. Henkel, 201 U. S. 43, 70, neither incor-
porated nor unincorporated associations can plead 
an unqualified right to conduct their affairs in secret .. 
Hale v. Henkel, supra; United States v. White, 322. 
u. s. 694. 
"While they may and should have protection from 
tmlawful demands made in the name of public inves--
tigation, cf. Federal Trade Comm'n v. American 
Tobacco Co., 264 U. S. 298, corporations can claim 
no equality with the individuals in the enjoyment: 
of a right of privacy.. Cf.. United States v. White, 
supra. They are• endowed with public attributes. 
They have a collective impact upon society, from 
which they derive the privilege of acting as artificial 
entities. The Federal Government allows them 
tlbe_ privilege of engaging in interstate commerce. 
Favors from government often carry with them 
an enhanced measure of regulation. [Citations 
omitted.] Even if one were to regard the request; 
fo_r information in this case_ as caused by noth-· 
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ing more than official curiosity, nevertheless law..: 
enforcing agencies have a legitimate right to satisfy 
themselves that corporate behavior is consistent 
with the law and the public interest." 338 U. S: 
632, 651-652. 
We have no difficulty then in determining that the ( 
Secretary's requirements for the reporting of domestic 
financial transactions abridge no F Ollrth Amendment 
right of the banks them-;elves. The bank is not a mere 
- -stranger or bystander with respect to the transactions 
which it is required to record or report. The bank is 
itself a party to each of these transactions, earns portions 
or its income from conductmg such transactions, and in 
the past may have kept records of similar transactions: 
on a voluntary basis for its own purposes. The regula-
tions presently in effect governing the reporting of 
.domestic currency transactions require information as 
to the personal and business identity of the person con-
ducting the transaction and of the person or organiza-
tion for whom it was conducted, as well as a summary 
.description of the nature of the transaction. It is 
conceivable, and perhaps likely, that the bank might not 
of its own volition compile this amount of detail for its 
own purposes, and therefore to that extent the regula-
tions put the bank in the position of seeking information 
from the customer in order to eventually report it to the 
Government. But as we have noted above, "neither 
incorporated nor unincorporated associations carlgiead 
an un uahfiecl n ht t9 conduct their affairs in secret." 
United States v. orton a o., supra, at 652. 
The regulations do not impose unreasonable reporting · 
requirements on the banks. The regulations require the . 
reporting of information with respect to abnormally 
large transactions in . currency, much of which informa-
tion the. bank as a party to the. trans_actiQn alread~-
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possesses or would acquire in its own interest. To the 
extent that the regulations in connection with such 
transactions require the bank to obtain information 
from a customer simply because the Government wants 
it, the information is sufficiently described and limited in 
nature, and sufficiently related to a tenable congressional 
determination as to improper use of transactions of that 
type in interstate commerce, so as to withstand the 
Fourth Amendment challenge made by the bank plain-
tiffs. "[T]he inquiry is within the authority of the 
agency, the demand is not too indefinite and the informa-
tion sought is reasonably relevant. 'The gist of the 
protection is in the requirement, expressed in terms, that 
the disclosure sought shall not be unreasonable. '" United 
States v. Morton Salt Co., supra, at 652-653, see Okla. 
Press Pub. Co. v. Walling, 327 U.S. 186, 208 (1946). 
In addition to the Fourth Amendment challenge to 
the domestic reporting re uirements made by the bank 
plain,t.iffs, we are aced with a similar challenge by the 
depositor plain!iffs, who contend that since the reports 
of domestic transactions which the bank is required to 
make will include transactions to which the depositors 
were parties, the requirement that the bank make a 
report of the transaction violates the Fourth Amendment 
rights of the depositor. The complaint filed in the Dis-
trict Court by the ACLU and the depositors contains 
no allegation by any of the individual depositors that 
they were .engaged in t,he type of $10,000 domestic 
currency transaction which would necessitate that their 
bank report it to the Government. This is not a situ-
.ation where there might have been a mere oversight 
in the specificity of the pleadings and where this Court 
could properly infer that participation in such a transac-
check; as our discussion of the challenges by the indi-
vidual plaintiffs allege that they are in fact ''depositors." 
Such an inference can be· made, for example, as to the: 
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recordkeeping provisions of Title I, which require the 
banks to keep various records of certain transactions by 
check; as our discussion of the challenges by the indi-
vidual depositors to the recordkeeping provisions, supra, 
implicitly recognizes, the allegation that one is a deposi-
tor is sufficient to permit consideration of the challenges 
to the recordkeeping provisions, since any depositor 
would to some degree be affected by them. Here, how-
ever, we simply cannot assume that the mere fact that one I 
is a de ~sitor in a a1:k ~ ean~ t:1at he has ~nga;~O ~~;'~11 ~~ . 
engage m a transact10n rnvo vmg more t an , m 
c~ rency, which is the only type of domestic transaction 
which the Secretary's regulations require that the banks 
report. That being so, the depositor plaintiffs lack stand- ( 
ing to challenge the domestic reportmg regulations, since 
they do not show that t.Jleir t ransact10ns are required to 
be reported. 
"Plaintiffs in the fed.eral cou;ts 'must allege some I 
threatened or actual injury resulting from the puta-
tively illegal action before a federal court may as-
sume jurisdiction.' Linda R. S. v. Richard D., 410 
U. S. 614, 617 (1973). There must be a 'personal 
stake in the outcome' such as to 'assure that con-
crete adverseness which sharpens the presentation 
of issues upon which the court so largely depends for 
illumination of difficult constitutional questions. ' 
Baker v. Carr, 369 U. S. 186, 204 (1962) .. .. 
Abstract injury is not enough. It must be alleged 
that the plaintiff 'has sustained or is immediately 
in danger of sustaining some direct injury' as the 
result of the challenged statute or official conduct. 
Massachusetts v. Mellon, 262 U.S. 447, 488 (1923). 
The injury or threat of injury must be both 'real 
and immediate,' not 'conjectural' or 'hypothetical.' 
Qolden v. Zwickler, 394 U. S. 103, 109-110 (19,69) ; , 
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Maryland Casualty Co. v: Pacific Coal & Oil Co.; 
312 U.S. 270, 273 (1941); United Public Workers V; 
Mitchell, 330 U. S. 75, 89-91 (1947)." O'Shea v. 
Littleton, 414 U. S. -, - (1974) (footnote 
omitted) . 
We therefore hold that the Fourth Amendment claims / 
~f ~ e dep~ tor plaintiffs may n~t be considered ~n j ~e 
record before us. ""N or do we thmk t fiat the Cahforma 
i!ankers ~ iation or the Security National Bank can 
vicariously assert such Fourth Amendment claims on be-
half of bank customers in general. 
The regulations promulgated by the Secretary requires 
that a r~port concerning a domestic currency transaction 
involving more than $10,000 be filed only by the financial 
institution which is a party to the transaction; the regu-
lations do not require a report from the customer. 31 
CFR § 103.22; see 311 U. S. C, § 1082. Both the bank 
and depositor plaintiffs !\ere argue that the regulations 
ate constitutionally d~fectiv~ b~cause they do not require 
the financial institution to notify the customer that a 
report will be filed concerning the domestic currency 
transaction. Since we have held that the depositor 
plaintiffs have not made a sufficient showing of injury to 
make a constitutional challenge to the domestic report-
ing requirements, we do not address ourselves to the 
necessity of notice to those bank customers whose trans-
actions must" 5'e r~ ort"ea . 'I1he fact that the regulations 
do n ot require the banks to notify the customer of the 
report violates no constitutiohal right of the banks, and 
the banks in any event are left free to adopt whatever 
customer notifica.tion procedures they desire.28 
28 Plaintiffs similarly contend that the Secretary 's regulation re-:-
quiring the reporting of domestic currency transactions only by the 
banks or financial institutions which are parties thereto, violates 
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C. F zyTH AMENDMENT CHALLENGE TO THE FOREIGN 
AND D OMESTIC R EPORTING REQUIREMENTS 
The District Court rejected the depositor plaintiffs' 
ciaim that the foreign reporting requirements violated 
the depositors' Fifth Amendment privilege against self-
incrimination, and found · it unnecessary to consider 
the similarly-based challenge to the domestic reporting 
requirements since the latter were found to be in yiola-
a specific requirement of i he Act. Section 222 of the Act., 31 
U. S. C. § 1082, provides in pertinent part : 
"The report of an)· transaction required to be reported under this 
chapter shall be signed or otherwise made both by the domestic 
financial institution involved and by one or more of the other 
parties thereto or participants therein, as the Secretary may require ." 
Plaintiffs contend that this language requires the Secretary to require 
either a signature on the report by the individual customer in the 
currency tranSilction, or a report from that customer. Since the 
Secretary has only required a report from the financial institution , 
plaintiffs urge, in addition , that there will not be notice of the reporf; 
to the individual customer. 
In rebuttal, the Government urged in oral nrgument, Tr. of Oral 
Arg. 64-70, that not only does section 206 of the Act, 31 U. S. C. 
§ 1055, give the Secretary broad nuthority to make exceptions to 
the requirements of the Act in promulgating the regulations, but 
that the House and Senate Reports on the bill:, considered by each 
house of the Congress, each of which contained a provision identic:11 
to the language of section 222, indicatrd that rach chamber read 
that language differently. The Senate Committee believed that the 
language permitted the Secretary to require reports from the finan-
cial institution . the customer, or both, S. Rep. No. 91-1139, supra, 
at 15, while the House Committee felt that the language required 
reports to be filed by both the financial institution and the customer, 
H. R. Rep. No. 91-975, supra, at 22. 
We similarly do not reach this claim as it relates to the depositor 
plaintiffs since they failed to allege sufficient injury below. What-
ever the merits of such a contention vis-a-vis the dt>positors, the 
regulation clearly has no adverse effect on any constitutional right 
of the banks, since the statute indisputably authorizes the Secre• 
tary to require a report from t he bank. 
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tion of the Fourth Amendment. The appeal of the 
depositor plaintiffs in No. 72-1196 challenges the foreign 
reporting requirements under the Fifth Amendment, and 
their brief likewise challenges the domestic reporting 
requirements as violative of that Amendment. Since 
they are free to urge in this Court reasons for affirming 
the judgment of the District Court which niay not have 
been relied upon by the District Court, we consider her~ 
the Fifth Amendment objections to both the foreign and 
the domestic reporting requirements. 
As we noted above, the bank plai11tiffs. being corpora-
tions, hav~ ho constitutional privilege against self-
incrimination by virtue of the Fifth Amendment. Hale 
v. Henkel , supra. Their brief urg<"s that they may vicari-
ously assert Fifth Amendment claims on behalf of their 
depositors. But since we hold infra that those depositor 
plaintiffs who are actually parties to this action are 
premature in asserting any Fifth Amendment claims. we 
do not believe that the banks under these circumstances 
have standing to assert Fifth Amendment claims on 
behalf of customers in general. 
The individual depositor plaintiffs below made various 
allegations in the complaint _and affidaviPfiled in the 
District Court. Plaint_iff Stark alleged that he was, in 
addition to being president of plaintiff Security National 
Bank, a customer of and depositor in the bank. Plaintiff 
Marson alleged that he was a c·ustomer of and depositor 
in the Bank of America. Plaintiff Lieberman alleged 
that he had repeatedly in the recent past transported or 
shipped one or more monetary instruments exceeding 
$5,000 in value from the Unit~d States to places outside 
the United States, and expected to do likewise in the near 
future. Plaintiffs Lieb~nuan, Harwood, Bruer, and 
Durell each alleged that they maintained a financial 
interest in and signature authority over one 'or more ba11k 
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accounts in foreign countries. This, so far as we can 
ascertain from the record, is the sum and substance of the 
depositors' allegations of fact upon which they seek to 
mount an attack on the reporting requirements of regu-
lations as violative of the privilege against self-
incrimination granted to each of them by the Fifth 
Amendment. 
Considering first the challenge of the depositor plain-
tiffs to the foreign reporting requirements, we hold that 
such claims are premature. In United States v. Sullivan, 
274 U. S. 259 (1927) , this Court reviewed a judgment of 
the Circuit Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit, 15 
F. 2d 809 (1926), which had held that the Fifth Amend-
ment protected the respondent from being punished for 
failure to file an income tax return. This Court reversed 
the decision below, stating: 
"As the defendant's income was taxed, the statute 
of course required a return. See United State.s v. 
Sischo , 262 U. S. 165. In the decision that this was 
contrary to the Constitution we are of opinion that 
the protection of the Fifth Amendment was pressed 
too far. If the form of return provided called for 
answers that the defendant was privileged from· 
making he could have raised the objection in the 
return, but could not on that account refuse to make 
any return at all. We are not called on to decide 
what, if anything, he might have withheld. Most 
of the items warranted no complaint. It would be 
an extreme if not an extravagant application of the 
Fifth Amendment to say that it authorized a man 
to refuse to state the amount of his income because 
it had been made in crime. But if the defendant 
desired to test that or any other point he should 
have tested it in the return so that it could be passed 
upon. He could not draw a conjurer's circle around 
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the whole matter by his own declaration that to 
write any word upon the government blank would 
bring him into danger of the law." 274 U. S., at 
263-264. 
Here the depositor plaintiffs allege that they intend 
\o engage in foreign currency transactions or dealings 
with foreign banks which the Secretary's regulations will 
require them to report, but they make no additional 
allegation that any of the information required by the 
Secretary will tend to incriminate them. It will be time 
enough for us to determine what, if any, relief from the 
reporting requirement they may obtain in a judicial pro~ 
ceeding when they have properly and specifically raised 
a claim of privilege with respect to particular items of 
information required by the Secretary, and the Secretary 
has overruled their claim of privilege. The posture of 
plaintiffs' Fifth Amendment rights here is strikingly 
similar to those asserted in Communi,st Party v. SACB, 
supra, 367 U. S., at 105-110. The Party there sought to 
assert the Fifth Amendment claims of its officers as a 
defense to the registration requirement of the Subversive 
Activities Control Act, although the officers were not at 
that stage of the proceeding required by the Act to 
register, and had neither registered nor refused to register 
on the grounds that registration might incriminate them. 
The Court said : 
"If a claim of privilege is made, it may or may not 
be honored by the Attorney General. We cannot, 
on the basis of supposition that privilege will 
be claimed and not honored, proceed now to 
adjudicate the constitutionality under the Fifth 
Amendment of the registration provisions. What-
ever proceeding may be taken after and if the privi-
lege is claimed will provide an adequate forum for 
litigation of that issue." 367 U. S., at 107. 
72-985, 72-1073, & 72-1196--OPINION 
50 CALIFORNIA BANKERS ASSN. v. SHULTZ 
Plaintiffs argue that cases such as Albertson v. SAGE, 
382 U. S. 70 (1965), have relaxed the requirement of 
earlier cases, but we do not find that contention sup-
ported by the language or holding of that case. There 
the Attorney General had petitioned for and obtained an 
order from the SACB compelling certain named members 
of the Communist Party to register their affiliation. In 
response to the Attorney General's petitions, both before 
the Board and in subsequent judicial proceedings, the 
Communist Party members had asserted the privilege 
against self-incrimination, and their claims had been 
rejected by the Attorney Gener_al. A previous decision 
of this Court had held that an affirmative answer to the 
inquiry as to membership in the Communist Party was 
an incriminating admission protected under the Fifth 
Amendment. Blau v. United States, 340 U. S. 159· 
( 1950) . The differences then between the posture of the 
depositor plaintiffs in this case and that of petitioner in 
Albertson v. SACB, supra, are evident. 
We similarly think that the depositor plaintiffs' chal- ~/1 
lenge to the domestic reporting requirements are prema- 'V ( 
ture. As we noted above, it is not apparent from the 
allegations of the complaints in these actions that any of 
the depositor plaintiffs would be engaged in $10,0001 
domestic transactions with the bank which the latter 
would be required to report under the Secretary's regula-
tions pertaining to such domestic transactions. Not 
only is there no allegation that any depositor engaged in 
such transactions, but there is no allegation in the com-
plaint that any report which such a bank was required to, 
make would contain information incriminating any de-
positor. To what extent, if any, depositors may claim a 
privilege arising from the Fifth Amendment by reason 
of the obligation of the bank to report such a transaction 
may be left for resolution when the claim of privilege is. 
properly asserted. 
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Depositor plaintiffs rely on Marchetti v. United States, 
390 U.S. 39 (1968), Grosso v. United States, 390 U.S. 62 
(1968), and Haynes v. United States, 390 U.S. 85 (1968), 
as supporting the merits of their Fifth Amendment claim. 
In each of those cases, however, a claim of privilege was 
asserted as a defense to the requirement of reporting 
particular information required by the law under chal-
lenge, and those decisions therefore in no way militate 
against our conclusion that depositor plaintiffs' efforts to 
litigate the Fifth Amendment issue at this time are 
premature. 
D . PLAINTIFF ACLU's Frnsr AMENDMENT CHALLENGE 
To THE FOREIGN AND DoMESTic REPORTING 
REQUIREMENTS 
The ACLU claims that the reporting requirements 
with respect to foreign and domestic transactions invade 
its associational interests protected by the First Amend-
ment. We have earlier held a similar claim by this 
organization to be speculative and hypothetical when 
addressed to the recordkeeping requirements imposed by 
the Secretary. Ante, pp. - --. The requirement 
that particular transactions be reported to the Govern-
ment, rather than records merely being kept to be avail-
able through normal legal process, removes part of the 
speculative quality of the claim. But the only allegation 
found in the complaints with respect to the financial 
activities of the ACLU states that it maintains accounts 
at one of the San Francisco offices of the Wells Fargo 
Bank and Trust Company. There is no allegation that 1 
the ACLU engages with any regularity in abnormally 
large domestic currency transactions, transports or re-
ceives monetary instruments from channels of foreign 
commerce, or maintains accounts in financial institutions 
in foreign countries. Until there is some showing, that 
the reporting requirements contained in the Secretary's 
,~ 
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regulations would require the reporting of information 
with respect to the organization's financial activities, no 
concrete controversy is presented to this Court for-
· adjudication. O'Shea v. Littleton, 414 U. S. -, 
(1973). 
V 
All of the bank and depositor plaintiffs have stressed 
in their presentations to the District Court and to this 
Court that the recordkeeping and reporting requirements 
of the Bank Secrecy Act are focused in large part on the 
acquisition of information to assist in the enforcement of 
the criminal laws. While, as we have noted, Congress 
seems to have been equally concerned with civil liability 
which might go undetected by reason of transactions of 
the type required to be recorded or reported, concern for 
the enforcement of the criminal law was undoubtedly 
prominent in the minds of the legislators who considered 
the Act. We do not think it is strange or irrational that 
Congress, having its attention called to what appeared to 
be serious and organized efforts to avoid the detection 
and apprehension of criminal activity, should have legis-
lated to rectify the situation, We have no doubt that, 
Congress, in the sphere of its legislative authority, may 
just as properly address itself to the effective enforce-
ment of criminal laws which it has previously enacted as 
to the enactment of those laws in the first instance. In 
so doing, it is of course subject to the strictures of the 
Bill of Rights, and may not transgress those strictures. 29 
But the fact that a legislative enactment manifests a. 
29 There have been recent hearings in Congress on various 
legislative proposals to amend the Bank Secrecy Act . Hearings 
before the Subcommittee on Financial Inst itutions of the Senate 
Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs to amend the 
Bank Secrecy Act, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. (1972) . See S. 3814 and 
S, 3828, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. (1972). 
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concern for the enforcement of the criminal law does not 
cast any generalized pall of constitutional suspicion over 
it. Having concluded that on the record before us the 
bank plaintiffs and the . depositor plaintiffs in these 
appeals have stated no cla1m for relief based on the First, 
Fourth, or Fifth Amendments, and having concluded that 
the enactment in question was within the legislative 
authority of Congress, our inquiry is at an end. 
On the appeal of the California Bankers Association 
in No. 72-985 from that portion of the judgment of the 
District Court upholding the recordkeeping requirements 
imposed by the Secretary pursuant to Title I, the judg-
ment is affirmed. On the appeal of the bank and de-
positor plaintiffs in No. 72-1196 from that portion of the 
District Court's judgment upholding the recordkeeping 
requirements and regulations of Title I and the foreign 
reporting requirements imposed under the authority of 
Title II, the judgment is likewise affirmed. On the Gov-
ernment's appeal in No. 72-1073 from that portion of 
the District Court's judgment which held that the do-
mestic reporting requirements imposed under Title II of 
the Act violated the Constitution, the judgment is re-
versed. The cause is remanded to the District Court 
for disp_osition consistent with this opinion. 
So ordered. 
jb/ss 3/27/74 
No. 72-985 CALIFORNIA BANKERS v. SHULTZ 
E: 
MR. JUSTIC POWELL, concurring. 
.I\ 
I join the Court's opinion, but 
£~ ~~ -1-o -~ 
i~t.uile /~rr a word con-
cerning the Act's domestic reporting requirements. 
The Act confers broad authority on the Secretary to 
require reports of domestic monetary transactions from the 
financial institutions and parties involved. 31 U.S.C. 
j § 1081 and 1082. The implementing regulations, however, 
require only that the financial institution "file a report 
on each deposit, withdrawal, exchange of currency or other 
payment or transfer, by, through, or to such financial 
institution, which involves a transaction in currency of 
more than $10,000." 31 CFR § 103.22 (italics added). 
As the Court properly recognizes, we must analyze appellees' 
contentions ... in the context of the Act as narrowed by 
the regulations. ; o~ at From this perspective, I 
agree that the regulations do not constitute an impermissible 
infringement on any constitutional right. 
2. 
A significant extension of the regulation's reporting 
~ ~/lM.JL 
requirements, however, migh~ pose) substantial and difficult 
constitutional questions. In their full reach, the reports 
~~ ~-~ ~~-dr~~~ 
- I A authorized by th~Act , o fr'"upon intimate areas of 
an individual's personal affairs. Financial transactions 
can reveal much about a person's activities, associations, 
beliefs, and thoughts. At some point, governmental intrusion 
upon these areas could implicate legitimate expectations of 
privacy. Moreover, the potential for abuse is particularly 
acute where, as here, the legislative scheme permits access 
to this information without invocation of the judicial process. 
In such instances, the important responsibility for balancing 
societal and individual interests is left to unreviewed 
a 
executive discretion, rather than the scrutiny of/neutral 
magistrate. United States v. United States District Court, 
407 U.S. 297, 313-317 (1971). As the issues are presently 
a~re& 
framed, however, I Qf!i!i1-!'9l!ili~ the Court's disposition of the 
matter. 
- CHAMBERS OF 
~~ <!fomt ttf tlr.t ~mt.ta ~tattg 
,rultittgfon. J. C!f. 2ll~'l, ✓ 
.JUSTICE HARRY A . BLACKMUN 
Dear Lewis: 
March 29, 1974 
Re: No. 72-985 - The California Bankers Assn. v. Schultz 
No. 72-1073- Schultz v. The California Bankers Assn. 
No. 72-1196 - Stark v. Shultz 
If you will permit me, I would like to join you in your concurring 
opinion circulated today. This does not mean that I am receding from my 
joinder in Bill Rehnquist ' s opinion. 
Sincerely, 
✓~ 
Mr. Justice Powell 
Copies to the Conference 
-
CHAMBERS OF 
.:§u.prmtt Q}ttmf ttf tfyt 'J!lnitt~ ;§!alts 
~aslp.ngfon, Ia . QJ. 21lffe.l1~ 
JUSTICE WILLIAM 0 . DOUGLAS Mn.rch 29 , 1974 
1'-'IEMO TO THE CONFERENCE : 
In 72-985 , California Bankers v . Schultz and associated 
cases I am adding to my dissent the following para.graph : 
I agree in substance with my Brother Drennan ' s view that 
t he grant of authority of Congress t o the Secretary of t he Treasury 
is too broad to pass constitutional muster. This legislation is 
symptomatic of the slow eclipse of Congress by the mounting Executive 
power. The phenomenon is not brand new. It was the case in Schechter 
~- v. United States , 295 U. S. 495 . United States v. Robel , 389 U. S. 
258 , is a more recent example . I~ational Cable Television Assn . v. 
United States , _. _ . V. S. __ , and FPC v . New England Po·,rcr Co . , __ U. S. 
, are even more recent. These omnibus grants of power allow the 
Executive branch to make the law as it chooses in v iol2vtion of the 
teachings of Youngstmm Sheet & Tube Co . v. Sawyer , 343 U. S. 579, as 
·well as Schechter , that lawmaking i s a Cori..gressional , not an Executi-ve , 
function. 
~00 
WILLIJIJ'1 0 , DOUGLAS 
The Conference 
i ,. ~t. 
1st DRAFT 
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must analyze appellees' contentions in the context of the 
Act as narrowed by the regulations. Ante, at -. 
From this perspective, I agree that the regulations do 
not constitute an impermissible infringement on any 
constitutional right. 
A significant extension of the regulation's reporting 
requirements, however, would pose substantial and diffi-
cult constitutional questions for me. In their full reach, 
the reports apparently authorized by the open-ended 
language of the Act touch upon intimate areas of an 
individual's personal affairs. Financial transactions can 
reveal much about a person's activities, associations, 
and beliefs. At some point, governmental intrusion upon 
these areas would implicate legitimate expectations of 
privacy. Moreover, the potential for abuse is particularly 
acute where, as here, the legislative scheme permits access 
to this information without invocation of the judicial 
process. In such instances, the importallt responsibility 
for balancing societal and individual interests is left to 
unreviewed executive discretion, rather than the scrutiny 
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The Act confers broad author-ity on the Secretary to 
require reports of domestic monetary transactions from 
the financial institutions and parties involved. 31 
U. S. C. §§ 1081 and 1082. The implementing regula-
tions, however, require only that the financial institution 
"file a report on each deposit, withdrawal, exchange of 
currency or other payment or transfer, by, through , or 
to such financial institution, which involves a transac-
tion in currency of more than $10,000." 31 CFR § 103.22 
,,. ,.,.---
a VV' 
72-985, 72-1073, & 72-1196-CONCUR 
2 CALIFORNIA BANKERS ASSN. v. SHULTZ 
(italics added) . As the Court properly recognizes, we 
must analyze appellees' contentions in the context of the 
Act as narrowed by the regulations. ~ at -. 
From this perspective, I agree that the regulations do 
not constitute an impermissible infringement on any 
constitutional right. 
a..-A significant extension of the regulation's reportin 
requirements, however, would pose m• a.e SU s antial 
and difficult constitutional questionsfl"n their full reach, 
the reports apparently authorized by the open-ended 
language of the Act touch upon intimate areas of an 
individual's personal affairs. Financial transactions ca.'f ( 
___ r_e-v_e_al much about a person's activities, associations,jet- l ¼-' 
- liefs~ nd thetights. At some point, governmental m-
trusion upon these areas could implicate legitimate 
expectations of privacy. Moreover, the potential for 
abuse is particularly acute where, as here, the legisla-
tive scheme permits access to this information without 
invocation of the judicial process. In such instances, 
the important responsibility for balancing societal and 
individual interests is left to unreviewed executive dis-
cretion, rather than the scrutiny of a neutral magistrate. 
-..... , United States v. United States District Cmtrt, 407 U. S. 
297, 313-317 (1971). As the issues are presently framed, 
~ however, I ~ the Court's disposition of the matter. 
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